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THE BURGER COURT AND THE




Significant scholarly inquiry has focused on the Burger
Court's civil liberties decisions. Commentators have dissected the
Court's opinions to discover a pattern underlying the Court's ap-
proach to these cases. Most efforts have scrutinized the Court's
decisionmaking process in the areas of criminal law and proce-
dure,' the first amendment 2 and the right of privacy.3  These
observers have generally suggested that the Burger Court is re-
treating from the activist, libertarian philosophy of the Warren
Court.
4
t Associate Professor of Law, Tulane Law School. B.S. 1972, Cornell University; J.D.
1975, Yale Law School.
See, e.g., Dershowitz & Ely, Harris v. New York: Some Anxious Observations on the
Candor and Logic of the Emerging Nixon Majority, 80 YALE L.J. 1198 (1971); Israel, Criminal
Procedure, The Burger Court, and the Legacy of the Warren Court, 75 Micu. L. REV. 1320
(1977); Stephens, The Burger Court: New Dimensions in Criminal Justice, 60 GEO. L.J. 249
(1971); Swindler, The Court, the Constitution, and Chief Justice Burger, 27 VAND. L. REV. 443,
457-64 (1974).
2 See, e.g., Meiklejohn, Religion in the Burger Court: The Heritage of Mr. Justice Black, 10
IND. L. REV. 645 (1977); Swindler, supra note 1, at 464-68.
' See, e.g., Lee, The Supreme Court on Privacy and the Press, 12 GA. L. REV. 215 (1978).
Of course, the Court's diversified docket affords Court-watchers the opportunity to
examine its performance in areas besides civil liberties. See, e.g., Freeman, A Study in Con-
trasts: The Warren and Burger Courts' Approach to the Securities Laws, 83 DICK. L. REv. 183
(1979).
4 See, e.g., Dershowitz & Ely, supra note 1; Nikiforov, The Supreme Court of the United
States: A Shift to the Right?, 53 TUL. L. REV. 720, 723-24, 730 (1979); Stephens, supra note 1,
at 277-78; Stone, The Miranda Doctrine in the Burger Court, 1977 Sup. CT. REV. 99, 169;
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In its last three terms, the Supreme Court has contributed
substantially to the body of employment discrimination law.5 The
Court issued ten opinions dealing with the right to equal
employment opportunity during the 1976-77 term,6 eleven such
decisions during the 1977-78 term, 7 and nine more during the
1978-79 session.8 Although these cases presented the Court with
the opportunity to address a wide range of statutory and constitu-
tional issues, this Article will focus on only one of these
questions-the evolving nature of plaintiff's prima facie case in
actions alleging a denial of equal employment opportunity. It will
also consider whether the Burger Court's general retreat in the
civil rights area has influenced the Court's disposition of employ-
ment discrimination cases and caused it to increase the plaintiff's
initial burden in these cases. A thorough examination of this ques-
tion will lead to conclusions regarding a proper allocation of bur-
dens of proof in employment discrimination litigation arising
under either the Constitution or federal statutes.
Wilkes, The New Federalism in Criminal Procedure: State Court Evasion of the Burger Court (pt.
1), 62 Ky. L.J. 421 (1974). But see Israel, supra note 1, at 1416-25.
' See generally Edwards, The Coming of Age of the Burger Court: Labor Law Decisions of the
Supreme Court During the 1976 Term, 19 B.C. L. REV. 1, 4-36 (1977); Friedman, Constitutional
and Statutory Challenges to Discrimination in Employment Based on Sexual Orientation, 64 IowA L.
REV. 527, 527, 561-71 (1979); 1976-1977 Annual Survey of Labor Relations and Employment
Discrimination Law, 18 B.C. INDUS. & CoM. L. REV. 1045, 1118-89 (1977).
6 Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977); Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States,
433 U.S. 299 (1977); Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355 (1977); TWA, Inc. v.
Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977); United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553 (1977); East
Tex. Motor Freight Sys., Inc. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395 (1977); International Bhd. of
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977); Electrical Workers Local 790 v. Robbins
& Myers, 429 U.S. 229 (1976); General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976); Parker
Seal Co. v. Cummins, 429 U.S. 65 (1976).
7 Board of Trustees v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24 (1978); Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters,
438 U.S. 567 (1978); Monell v. Department of Social Serv., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); City of
Los Angeles v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978); Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291 (1978);
Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575 (1978); Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412
(1978); United Air Lines, Inc. v. McMann, 434 U.S. 192 (1977); Richmond Unified School
Dist. v. Berg, 434 U.S. 158 (1977); Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136 (1977); Shell
Oil Co. v. Dartt, 434 U.S. 99 (1977).
" United Steelworkers v. Weber, 99 S. Ct. 2721 (1979); Great Am. Fed. Say. & Loan
Ass'n v. Novotny, 99 S. Ct. 2345 (1979); Personnel Adm'r v. Fenney, 99 S. Ct. 2282 (1979);
Davis v. Passman, 99 S. Ct. 2264 (1979); Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 99 S. Ct. 2066 (1979);
Ambach v. Norwick, 99 S. Ct. 1589 (1979); County of Los Angeles v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625
(1979); New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568 (1979); Vance v. Bradley,
440 U.S. 93 (1979).
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
I
TRADITIONAL ALLOCATION OF PROOF REQUIREMENTS
IN EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LITIGATION
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19649 prohibits employ-
ment discrimination by private' 0 and public" employers on the
basis of race, color, sex, religion, and national origin. 12 The Su-
preme Court has recognized two alternative theories of discrimi-
nation, each accompanied by its own method of proof.13
A. Disparate Treatment
The most common and obvious type of discrimination in-
volves an employer's overtly different treatment of individuals
based solely on those persons' race, color, sex, religion, or national
origin. In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,'4 the Court outlined
the general requirements of a prima facie case for actions alleging
such "disparate treatment." While noting that the specific ele-
ments of plaintiff's initial burden will vary with the factual pos-
ture of each case,' 5 the Court declared that in most instances,
plaintiff would sustain the initial burden by proving
(i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and
was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking
applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected;
and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position remained open
and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons of
complainant's qualifications. 16
The plaintiff, therefore, has only a small burden to satisfy
before compelling the defendant to come forward with some evi-
dence in its defense. The plaintiff need only show that he or she
9 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 20OO0e-17 (1976).
10 Id. §§ 2000e(b), 2000e-2(a).
11 Id. §§ 2000e-16, 2000e-2.
12 Id. § 2000e-2(a).
13 International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977). See
B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 1-12, 14-17, 73-75 (1976).
For a case discussing the alternative nature of these theories, see Pennsylvania v. Local 542,
International Union of Operating Eng'rs, 469 F. Supp. 329, 398-99 (E.D. Pa. 1978). See also
Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 572-73 (1978).
14 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
15 Id. at 802 n.13.
'6 Id. at 802 (footnote omitted).
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is a qualified minority individual who was not chosen for an avail-
able employment opportunity. Few non-frivolous plaintiffs will be
unable to survive this initial screening device."7 The McDonnell
Douglas Court inferred, upon proof of these four factors and the
absence of any explanation by the defendant, that a rejection of
the plaintiff-applicant was based on a consideration proscribed by
Title VII.' 8 Consequently, a plaintiff can make a prima facie case
of disparate treatment without offering any evidence of the de-
fendant's discriminatory intent.' 9
Of course, a plaintiff's success in making out a prima facie
case does not end the analysis in disparate treatment cases. It
simply shifts the burden to the defendant to explain its actions.
The nature and extent of this burden of production has been the
subject of debate since the McDonnell Douglas decision. Unfortu-
nately, the Court's two recent attempts at resolving this con-
troversy only further confused matters.2 0
In McDonnell Douglas, the Court declared that once the plain-
tiff establishes a prima facie case, "[t]he burden then must shift to
the employer to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for the employee's rejection."'" This apparently straight-
forward statement, however, has raised two additional, trouble-
some issues. First, the Court's use of "articulate" as opposed to
"prove" perhaps implied that the defendant bears only a light
burden after the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case. Second,
the Court failed to indicate clearly whether the defendant's evi-
dence must show the existence of a single, nondiscriminatory jus-
tification or must help negate the presence of any discriminatory
motive.
The McDonnell Douglas Court's failure to define the nature of
defendant's burden has divided the lower courts. Some tribunals
have emphasized the Court's choice of the word "articulate" in-
stead of "prove" in McDonnell Douglas. This choice, these courts
"7 See Sweeney v. Board of Trustees, 569 F.2d 169, 177 (Ist Cir.) (requirements not
very arduous burden on plaintiff), vacated and remanded for reconsideration per curiam, 439
U.S. 24 (1978); B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 13, at 1155 (plaintiffs frequently find
burden of establishing prima facie case relatively easy).
18 The Court recently reaffirmed its adherence to this scheme. See Board of Trustees v.
Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24 (1978); Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978).
" See 2 A. LARSEN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 50.10 (1975).
21 See notes 24-56 and accompanying text infra.
21 411 U.S. at 802 (emphasis added).
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reason, indicates that defendants need only come forward with
some credible evidence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory justifica-
tion. Other courts, however, opine that casting such a minimal
burden upon defendants is meaningless. They conclude that the
plaintiff's establishment of a prima facie case should shift the
burden of persuasion to defendant. To prevail, the defendant
then must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a non-
discriminatory explanation supports its actions. 3
The Supreme Court addressed this issue in two opinions ren-
dered during the latter portion of its 1977-78 term. In Furnco
Construction Corp. v. Waters,2 4 three black bricklayers claimed that
an employer's policy of refusing to accept applications at the job-
site constituted racial discrimination in violation of Title VII.
After affirming the Seventh Circuit's ruling that plaintiffs had es-
tablished a prima facie case under the McDonnell Douglas stan-
dard,25 the Court examined the burden which then fell upon the
defendant. Unfortunately, the imprecise language used by the
Furnco majority failed to clarify the Court's thinking. Instead of
facing the conflict in the lower courts and explaining the defen-
dant's burden of proof under McDonnell Douglas, the Court beg-
ged the question by using both words in the operative paragraph.
When the prima facie case is understood in the light of the
opinion in McDonnell Douglas, it is apparent that the burden
which shifts to the employer is merely that of proving that he
based his employment decision on a legitimate considera-
tion .... To dispel the adverse inference from a prima facie
showing under McDonnell Douglas, the employer need only "ar-
ticulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the
employee's rejection." 26
22 See, e.g., Powell v. Syracuse Univ., 580 F.2d 1150, 1155-56 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 99 S.
Ct. 576 (1978); Barnes v. St. Catherine's Hosp., 563 F.2d 324, 329 (7th Cir. 1977); Flowers
v. Crouch-Walker Corp., 552 F.2d 1277, 1281-82 (7th Cir. 1977); Harper v. Trans World
Airlines, Inc., 525 F.2d 409, 411 (8th Cir. 1975); Sabol v. Snyder, 524 F.2d 1009, 1012
(10th Cir. 1975); Rich v. Martin Marietta Corp., 522 F.2d 333, 347-48 (10th Cir. 1975);
Gates v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 492 F.2d 292, 295-96 (9th Cir. 1974). Cf. Loeb v. Textron,
Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1011-12 (1st Cir. 1979) (later Supreme Court decision in Board of
Trustees v. Sweeney established this as the correct position).
23 See, e.g., Williams v. Bell, 587 F.2d 1240, 1245 n.45 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Turner v.
Texas Instruments, Inc., 555 F.2d 1251, 1255 (5th Cir. 1977); Ostapowicz v. Johnson, 541
F.2d 394, 399 (3d Cir. 1976); Osborne v. Cleland, 468 F. Supp. 1302, 1303 (E.D. Ark.
1979); Randolph v. United States Elevator Corp., 452 F. Supp. 1120, 1124 (S.D. Fla. 1978).
24 438 U.S. 567 (1978).
25 Id. at 575.
26 Id. at 577-78 (emphasis added).
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Arguably, the Court meant that the two words are synony-
mous and interchangeable. The use of both "prove" and "articu-
late" may suggest that "articulate" takes on the meaning of
"prove" and the Court intends the defendant to shoulder the
burden of persuasion once the plaintiff has made out a prima
facie case. This conclusion, however, does not flow automatically
from the premise of synonymity, nor is it clearly supported by the
rest of the Court's opinion. Although the opinion indicates that
the employer must proffer some evidence of its motivation ,27 it
contains no discussion as to the extent of the defendant's burden
or the conflicting lower court opinions on this issue.
The Court again faced this question in Board of Trustees v.
Sweeney. 28  In that case, a female faculty member brought an ac-
tion against a state college alleging that two prior denials of pro-
motion resulted from sex discrimination.2 9  The First Circuit held
that the defendants' evidence failed to sustain their burden of
proving the absence of discriminatory motive.30 The court also
stated, however, that
[tihe ultimate burden of persuasion on the issue of discrimina-
tion remains with the plaintiff, who must convince the court by a
preponderance of the evidence that he or she has been the victim of
discrimination.31
The Supreme Court vacated the circuit court's decision, de-
claring that the lower tribunal had made two contradictory state-
ments on the burden of proof issue. 32  The Court tacitly recog-
nized that its own earlier choice of terminology had created
confusion about the appropriate allocation of burdens of proof,
But it declared that the citation to McDonnell Douglas in Furnco
emphasized that the employer need only "'articulate some legiti-
mate, nondiscriminatory reason for [its action]' "3 rather than
"'prove absence of discriminatory motive.' "34
27 Id. at 580.
28 439 U.S. 24 (1978) (per curiam).
29 Although her complaint asserted claims under the Constitution and several federal
statutes, only her Title VII claim was appealed. Sweeney v. Board of Trustees, 569 F.2d
169, 171 (1st Cir.), vacated and remanded for reconsideration per curiam, 439 U.S. 24 (1978).
30 569 F.2d at 177.
31 Id. (emphasis added).
32 439 U.S. at 24 n.1.
33 Id. at 24 (quoting McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973)).
24 Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting Sweeney v. Board of Trustees, 569 F.2d 169, 177
(1st Cir.), vacated and remanded for reconsideration per curiam, 439 U.S. 24 (1978)).
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This discussion, however, fails to separate the burden of
proof issue from the second of the two issues left unanswered by
McDonnell Douglas-the factual issue to which defendant's evi-
dence must be directed. Furthermore, it does not analyze the ex-
tent of the defendant's burden of proof. By reasserting its adher-
ence to the language of McDonnell Douglas, the Court only
perpetuated the dual ambiguities generated by that decision.
Nonetheless, at the end of its opinion, the Court suggested the
defendant bears only the burden of coming forward with some
credible evidence. 5
The four dissenting justices directly confronted these perplex-
ing problems by clearly separating and stating the issues.3 6  They
found no operative distinction between the word "prove" and "ar-
ticulate" because both terms involve the presentation of evidence
or proof rather than mere allegation of nondiscriminatory pur-
pose. 37  Nevertheless, the dissenters failed to provide any more
insight into this matter than that offered by the majority. Their
deficiency, like the majority's, lies in their failure to define clearly
the extent of the defendant's burden of proof; they did not spec-
ify whether the defendant must prove his case by a preponder-
ance of the evidence or some lesser standard.
Ultimately, the two opinions differ only slightly on this issue.
The majority held that the defendant's burden consists simply of
producing evidence of nondiscriminatory reasons; it need not dis-
prove plaintiff's prima facie case nor prove the absence of dis-
criminatory motive.3 8 Similarly, the dissenters concluded that the
employer must satisfy only the burden of producing evidence of
legitimate reasons, while "the burden of persuasion.., remains
with the plaintiff" to prove the existence of discrimination.3 9
Thus, defendants bear only the moderate 40 burden of coming
forward with some evidence to challenge the inference of discrimi-
nation generated by plaintiff's prima facie case.4'
35 439 U.S. at 25 n.2. On remand, the First Circuit interpreted the Supreme Court's
decision as placing on defendant only the burden of producing some evidence of a nondis-
criminatory explanation. Sweeney v. Board of Trustees, 604 F.2d 106, 109 (1st Cir. 1979).
36 439 U.S. at 28 (dissenting opinion, Stevens, J.).
37 Id.
38 Id. at 26 n.2.
39 Id. at 29 (dissenting opinion, Stevens, J.).
40 Cf. B. ScHLEi & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 13, at 1155-56 (defendant can normally
"articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason" for action even where reason is ar-
guably subjective).
41 Sweeney v. Board of Trustees, 604 F.2d 106, 108 (1st Cir. 1979).
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This interpretation of the defendant's burden of proof is con-
sistent with the third stage of the proof formula enunciated in
McDonnell Douglas. If the defendant satisfies its burden, the plain-
tiff receives an opportunity to show that the defendant's purport-
edly nondiscriminatory explanation is really a pretext shielding its
true discriminatory purpose.4 This final element brings
defendant's subjective motivation into issue, for it is here that
plaintiff must persuade the factfinder that defendant's conduct
resulted from a discriminatory purpose. The First Circuit and the
Supreme Court dissenters in Sweenev referred to this issue as the
ultimate question of identifying the basis for defendant's action.
Both recognized that on this point plaintiff must always bear the
burden of persuasion.4 3  Moreover, although they couched their
discussion in slightly different terms, the majority in Sweeney ulti-
mately concurred in this analysis. 44
Thus the Supreme Court's struggle to explicate the proof
requirements in disparate treatment cases resulted in a fairly
straightforward formula that lies within the interstices of its sev-
eral enigmatic opinions. The plaintiff creates an inference that the
employer unlawfully discriminated by showing that he belongs to
a protected class and that the employer denied him an available
employment opportunity for which he was qualified. Absent any
explanation by the defendant, the court presumes that the defen-
dant purposefully based his action upon an impermissible consid-
eration on the theory that employers do not base their decisions
on whim or caprice. 45 To avoid judgment for the plaintiff after a
prima facie case is made out, the defendant must initially claim a
nondiscriminatory justification for its action. Although the defen-
dant must buttress this claim with some evidence, and not simply
by a bare allegation in the pleadings, the plaintiff, after the
defendant's claim, shoulders the burden of persuading the
factfinder that the defendant intentionally discriminated against
him. To satisfy the burden, the plaintiff must prove by a prepon-
derance of the evidence that the defendant's justification is either
nonexistent or a sham.
42 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804 (1973). See also Furnco
Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 578 (1978).
43 439 U.S. at 29; 569 F.2d at 174-75.
44 439 U.S. at 24 n..
45 Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 575-77 (1978).
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This formulation of the proof requirements tracks the Court's
ambiguously articulated design that requires the defendant to
raise the issue of motivation initially, but places the burden of
persuasion on plaintiff once that question is put in issue. It also
places the burden of proving the essential element of the
claim -discrimination -on the party asserting it. Finally, by re-
quiring defendant to produce some evidence supporting its claim
of a legitimate basis for its action, plaintiff receives adequate
notice of the direction his proof of pretext or nonexistence should
take.46
The Court's terminology in McDonnell Douglas also generated
a dispute about the factual issue to be addressed by the defen-
dant's offer of proof. The McDonnell Douglas Court announced
that the defendant must articulate "some legitimate, nondis-
criminatory reason" 47 for its actions to dispel the inference gener-
ated by plaintiff's prima facie case. 48  Once again, however, the
Court obfuscated the issue in Furnco. The Furnco Court began by
explaining that defendant must prove "that he based his employ-
ment decision on a legitimate consideration, and not an illegitimate
one." 4" This phrasing strongly suggests that defendant's evidence
must not only show the existence of a legitimate basis for its deci-
sion but also reveal the total absence of any discriminatory motiva-
tion. The paragraph in which this passage is contained, however,
concludes with a recitation of the "'some legitimate, nondis-
criminatory reason'" language of McDonnell Douglas. 50 The
46 Flowers v. Crouch-Walker Corp., 552 F.2d 1277, 1282 (7th Cir. 1977). Cf. Turner v.
Texas Instruments, Inc., 555 F.2d 1251, 1255 (5th Cir. 1977) (stating that such benefit
flows from shifting burden of persuasion to defendant).
17 411 U.S. at 802 (emphasis added).
48 No factual determination on the employer's motivation was made by either the Su-
preme Court or the Eighth Circuit in McDonnell Douglas. Although the district court found
that the defendant's refusal to rehire plaintiff was based exclusively on a nondiscriminatory
reason, the Eighth Circuit reversed the lower court because "[t]he district court did not use
appropriate standards in determining whether McDonnell's refusal to hire Green was
racially motivated." Green v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 463 F.2d 337, 353 (8th Cir. 1972).
The circuit court never addressed the substantive issue concerning the nature of defen-
dant's proof of motivation. The Supreme Court vacated the Eighth Circuit's ruling and
articulated the proof guidelines for the district court to use in its retrial of the action. The
Supreme Court never made a factual finding that implemented the general proof stan-
dards put forth in the opinion. On retrial, however, the district court again found that the
employer's decision was not motivated by racial discrimination. Green v. McDonnell Doug-
las Corp., 390 F. Supp. 501, 502 (E.D. Mo. 1975), aff'd, 528 F.2d 1102, 1106 (8th Cir.
1976).
49 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978) (emphasis added).
50 Id. at 578.
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Court resolved the ambiguity of this contradictory language only
when it applied these proof standards to the evidence presented
at trial. Rather than requiring the defendant to prove the absence
of discrimination, the Court held that the defendant's showing of
a nondiscriminatory justification sufficed.51
The Court reaffirmed this position when it vacated the judg-
ment rendered by the First Circuit in Sweeney. The circuit court
had interpreted McDonnell Douglas to require the defendant to
demonstrate the absence of any discriminatory motive. 52 Just as
in Furnco, the Court rejected this analysis because the lower court
had imposed an undue burden of proof on the employer.53 The
Court reemphasized its adherence to the McDonnell Douglas stan-
dard requiring defendant to articulate only some legitimate
reason for its decision.54
The analysis in Furnco and Sweeney comports with the tripar-
tite proof standard applied in disparate treatment cases. Following
the plaintiff's prima facie case, the defendant bears the burden
simply of claiming a non-discriminatory justification. The plaintiff
must then prove that the alleged explanation is a pretext for dis-
crimination. Requiring the employer to refute the presence of any
discriminatory motive would deviate from the general proof for-
51 Furnco had alleged that its policy of hiring principally from a list of experienced
bricklayers constituted a legitimate and nondiscriminatory basis for refusing to consider
plaintiff. The appellate court held that the defendant failed to sustain its burden of proof,
because a less discriminatory hiring practice was available and should have been employed.
Waters v. Furnco Constr. Corp., 551 F.2d 1085, 1088-89 (7th Cir. 1977). This decision
implied that Furnco's showing of a legitimate motive failed because its failure to adopt a
less discriminatory practice indicated that discrimination was a factor behind its conduct.
Reversing the Seventh Circuit the Supreme Court ruled that the appellate court had im-
posed too heavy a burden on Furnco. The employer's burden, the Court reasoned, con-
sisted only of showing some nondiscriminatory justification. Contrary to what the first por-
tion of its discussion implied, the defendant was not required to prove the absence of a less
discriminatory alternative employment policy. 438 U.S. at 578.
52 Sweeney v. Board of Trustees, 569 F.2d 169, 177 (1st Cir.), vacated and remanded for
reconsideration per curiam, 439 U.S. 24 (1978).
53 439 U.S. at 25 & n.2.
'4 The dissenters could not distinguish between the teachings of McDonnell Douglas and
the rule employed by the First Circuit. They contended that by showing the existence of a
legitimate nondiscriminatory explanation for its action, the defendant simultaneously and
inherently demonstrated that bias was not a motivating factor. 439 U.S. at 29 (dissenting
opinion, Stevens, J.). This analysis, however, fails to acknowledge that any particular
employment decision may be caused by both legitimate and illegitimate considerations. The
dissent's reliance on language in the majority opinion in Furnco only underscores the am-
biguous and misleading nature of that opinion. See text accompanying notes 44-47 supra.
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mula by transferring the burden of proof from plaintiff to de-
fendant by effectively requiring the defendant to prove that its
nondiscriminatory justification is not a pretext. By proving that
defendant's nondiscriminatory explanation is a pretext, the plain-
tiff ipso facto identifies discrimination as the true motivating force
behind the employer's conduct. Because the existence of inten-
tional bias embodies the plaintiff's allegation in a disparate treat-
ment case, 55 and because proof of pretext translates into proof of
discriminatory intent,56 courts should place the burden of proving
that issue on the plaintiff.
B. Disproportionate Impact
In addition to a claim of disparate treatment, an aggrieved
individual can rely on another theory in filing an action under
Title VII. Since its decision in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,5 7 the Su-
preme Court has recognized that employment policies neutral on
their face can deprive persons of their right to equal employment
opportunity and violate Title VII. 58  Objective criteria often dis-
'5 See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977).
5 See Mosby v. Webster College, 563 F.2d 901, 903 (8th Cir. 1977).
57 401 U.S. 424 (1971). The employer required all applicants for employment or trans-
fer to have a high school education or pass a standardized general intelligence test. This
policy, the Supreme Court held, violated Title VII's ban on racial discrimination. The
Court based its ruling on a finding that both requirements disqualified black persons at a
significantly higher rate than white applicants and that the employer had failed to prove
that either standard was sufficiently related to successful job performance. Id. at 431-32.
58 This theory's most obvious application relates to aptitude and intelligence examina-
tions. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975). In addition, courts have
utilized it to invalidate employment practices that disqualify individuals for many reasons:
minimum height and weight requirements (Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 331
(1977)); arrest record history (Gregory v. Litton Sys. Inc., 316 F. Supp. 401, 403 (C.D. Cal.
1970), affd as modified, 472 F.2d 631, 632 (9th Cir. 1972)); all criminal convictions other
than minor traffic offenses (Green v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 549 F.2d 1158 (8th Cir. 1977));
and garnishment experience (Johnson v. Pike Corp. of America, 332 F. Supp. 490, 494-95
(C.D. Cal. 1971)).
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission has relied on this theory in voiding
a requirement that all job applicants possess an honorable discharge from the armed forces
after finding that this standard resulted in disproportionate exclusion of blacks and was
not supported by a business necessity. EEOC Decision No. 74-25, 2 EMPL. PRAc. GUIDE
(CCH) $ 6400 (Sept. 10, 1973). The Commission similarly struck down an employment bar
asserted against unwed parents because illegitimacy is more discernible with respect to a
female parent and thus it disproportionally excluded women. EEOC Decision No. 71-332,
[1973] EEOC DEC. (CCH) (Sept. 28, 1970). See also EEOC Decision No. 75-030, 12 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. 1355, 1357 (Sept. 24, 1974) (no evidence that discrimination against trans-
sexuals imposes disproportionate burden on male applicants). See generally Siniscalco,
Homosexual Discrimination in Employment, 16 SANTA CLARA LAw. 495, 507-08 (1976).
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qualify minority persons at a disproportionate rate because a his-
tory of discrimination prevents many of these individuals from
achieving a competitive position.5"  This "disproportionate im-
pact" model focuses on the discriminatory impact of facially neu-
tral policies rather than, as in disparate treatment cases, the intent
underlying the employer's action . 0  Consequently, the nature of
the proof required to make a prima facie case of such discrimina-
tion differs from that associated with claims of disparate treat-
ment.61
To establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the
disproportionate impact model, the plaintiff must prove that the
employer's policy has a substantially disproportionate exclusionary
impact 62 on his class, even though the practice applies equally to
all persons .6 3  Once the plaintiff has made such a showing, the
employer must persuade the factfinder that the challenged policy
relates to job performance. 64  If the employer sustains this bur-
den, however, the plaintiff can still prevail by showing that a less
discriminatory selection device would "serve the employer's
legitimate interest in 'efficient and trustworthy workmanship.' "65
59 See Comment, Appying the Title VII Prima Facie Case To Title VIII Litigation, 11 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 128, 154 (1976).
60 But see text accompanying note 72 infra.
61 See generally Friedman, supra note 5, at 565 n.212.
62 The federal courts have not adopted a uniform quantitative standard for what con-
stitutes a substantially disproportionate exclusionary impact. See Moore v. Southwestern
Bell Tel. Co., 593 F.2d 607, 608 (5th Cir. 1979); B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 13,
at 73-74; Shoben, Differential Pass-Fail Rates in Employment Testing: Statistical Proof Under Title
VII, 91 HARv. L. REV. 793, 794 (1978).
On August 25, 1978, however, the EEOC, the Labor Department's Office of Federal
Contract Compliance Programs, the Department of Justice, and the Civil Service Commis-
sion adopted a set of uniform testing guidelines providing standards for determining the
legality of selection procedures used by private and public employers. Among the impor-
tant provisions of the guidelines is § 4D, the "four-fifths rule." This rule provides that a
selection rate for members of a protected group of less than 80% of the rate for the
highest scoring group generally suffices to create a prima facie case of disproportionate
impact. This constitutes only a rule-of-thumb; the agencies will retain discretion in indi-
vidual cases. See 2 EMPL. PRAC. GuIDE (CCH) 4010.04. See generally Guidelines on
Employee Selection Procedures, 29 C.F.R. § 1607 (1978) (EEOC); 41 C.F.R. § 60-3 (1978)
(OFCCP); 28 C.F.R. § 50.14 (1978) (Dep't of Justice); 5 C.F.R. 300.103(c) (1978) (Civil
Service Comm'n).
63 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
64 Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329 (1977); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
411 U.S. 792, 802 n.14 (1973).
65 Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975) (quoting McDonnell Doug-
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The disproportionate impact theory stems from the belief
that not all discrimination is intentional. Discrimination can result
from a combination of neutral policies and a tradition of societally
imposed inequity. No one can identify a specific private culprit,
but relief seems appropriate and desirable. Absence of discrete,
individual responsibility should not, under this model, preclude
the review and invalidation of employment practices that build on
and perpetuate externally created, group-based inequalities. 6 6 Re-
liance upon this policy, however, has caused most commentators
and courts to misstate, in part, the nature of proof associated with
a claim of disproportionate impact and ignore a fundamental
similarity between the disproportionate impact and disparate
treatment concepts of discrimination.
C. Comparing the Two Models
In discussing disproportionate impact and comparing it to
disparate treatment, most academic and judicial observers em-
phasize that disproportionate impact analysis defines discrimina-
tion in terms of consequences, rather than motive. Under this
view, a successful plaintiff proves only discriminatory effects in a
disproportionate impact case, while proof of discriminatory intent
is critical for claims of disparate treatment. 67 This characteriza-
tion of the two theories, however, is not entirely accurate.
The plaintiff can make a prima facie case in a disproportion-
ate impact action by relying exclusively on evidence demonstrating
the discriminatory impact of an employer's policies. 68  But a
plaintiff asserting a claim of disparate treatment need not make a
showing of defendant's discriminating intent in his prima facie
case.6 9 Thus, under either theory, the plaintiff can require the
defendant to come forward with some defense without offering
any evidence of the employer's motivation.
las Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973)).
" See Blumrosen, Strangers in Paradise: Griggs v. Duke Power Co. and the Concept of
Employment Discrimination, 71 MIcH. L. REv. 59, 62-72 (1972); Comment, supra note 59, at
154-56.
67 See, e.g., International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15
(1977); Blumrosen, supra note 66, at 62; Shoben, Probing the Discriminatory Effects of
Employee Selection Procedures with Disparate Impact Analysis Under Title VII, 56 TEXAS L. REv.
1, 2 n.3, 5 (1977).
68 See, e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329 (1977); Albemarle Paper Co. v.
Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).




The two types of actions are distinct because, in a dispropor-
tionate impact case, a different burden shifts to the defendant
after the plaintiff has established a prima facie case. The
employer in a disparate treatment case must only come forward
with some credible evidence of a nondiscriminatory justification
for its action. 70  In a disproportionate impact case, however, the
defendant bears the more onerous burden of persuasion on its
defense of job-relatedness. 71
This difference has one immediate ramification: the more
exacting standard imposed upon defendants in disproportionate
impact suits more frequently disposes of actions at this stage than
does the relatively lax requirement imposed upon defendants in
disparate treatment claims. These cases, as well as those resolved
at the prima facie case stage, end without regard to defendant's
motivation or intent. On the other hand, the relatively light initial
burden placed upon plaintiff and defendant in disparate treat-
ment cases causes most of those actions to turn on the intent-
laden pretext issue. 72 Thus, the issue of intent is not frequently
litigated in disproportionate impact cases but is the critical ele-
ment of an allegation of disparate treatment.
The issue of intent, however, is not necessarily irrelevant to
disproportionate impact actions. If the defendant carries its bur-
den in proving the job-relatedness of its challenged employment
criterion, the plaintiff may rebut this defense by showing that an
alternative selection practice would generate a lesser discrimina-
tory impact while still fulfilling the employer's legitimate objectives.
If an alternative procedure is both efficient and less discrimina-
tory, the defendant's failure to adopt it probably was motivated by
a desire to retain the discriminatory impact of the original re-
quirement. As the Supreme Court recognized in Albemarle Paper
Co. v. Moody, 73 the plaintiff, by demonstrating the existence of an
alternative policy, shows that the defendant's reliance on the in-
cumbent screening device for its predictive value simply camou-
flages discrimination.74 This third stage of proof, then, resembles
70 See text accompanying notes 45-46 supra.
71 Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329 (1977); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422
U.S. 405, 425 (1975); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971). But see note 130
infra.
72 See Smith v. University of N. Carolina, 18 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. 913, 916 (M.D.N.C.
Nov. 9, 1978); B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 13, at 1155-56.
73 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
74 Id. at 425.
[Vol. 65:1
1979] EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 15
the intent-oriented third element (pretext) of proof in disparate
treatment cases.
Thus, a disproportionate impact suit offers plaintiff some
advantages over a disparate treatment action. In many dispro-
portionate impact suits, the plaintiff will not need to litigate the
difficult issue of the defendant's intent because of the heavier bur-
den placed on the defendant once the plaintiff has made out a
prima facie case. Plaintiffs, then, should prefer to proceed under
a claim of disproportionate treatment. This advantage may be in
jeopardy, however, because of a potentially broad decision by the




In Washington, two black men, who had applied unsuccessfully
for positions as police officelrs in the District of Columbia, brought
a class action suit against the District's police department challeng-
ing its recruiting procedures.76 They claimed that the depart-
ment's entrance requirements, including a written test,7 7 discrimi-
nated against black applicants on the basis of race, thus violating
their rights under the due process clause of the fifth amendment,
the Civil Rights Act of 1866,78 and a local ordinance.7 91  Plaintiffs
75 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
76 Two black police officers originally filed suit in federal district court against the
Chief of the District Police Department, the Commissioner of the District of Columbia, and
the Commissioner of the United States Civil Service Commission. Their complaint claimed
that the Department's promotion policies were racially discriminatory. Two other plaintiffs
intervened and filed an amended complaint. Only this latter portion of the case came
before the Supreme Court when the intervenors moved for partial summary judgment.
77 Acceptance into the Police Department's training program required that an applicant
satisfy physical and character standards, possess a high school diploma or its equivalent and
score at least 40 out of 80 on Test 21, the examination on which the case focused. De-
signed by the Civil Service Commission to test verbal ability, vocabulary, and reading com-
prehension, Test 21 is commonly used throughout the federal Civil Service. 426 U.S. at
234-35.
78 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976). This statute provides:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same
right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be
parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceed-
ings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens
Plaintiffs could not file a claim under Title VII because it was not applicable to federal
employers when their complaint was filed. See generally Brown v. General Servs. Adm'n,
425 U.S. 820, 825 (1976).
79 D.C. CODE § 1-320 (1973). This provision states:
In any program of recruitment or hiring of individuals to fill positions in the
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moved for partial summary judgment on only their federal con-
stitutional challenge to the department's recruiting policies; they
did not place their statutory causes of action in issue. The defen-
dants, officials of the District of Columbia and the United States
Civil Service, filed a cross-motion for summary judgment, assert-
ing that the plaintiffs were not entitled to relief on either their
constitutional or statutory claims.8 Both the plaintiffs' and de-
fendants' motions concerned only the validity of the written per-
sonnel examination, "Test 21." 81
The trial court denied the plaintiffs' motion and granted the
defendants' cross-motions, entering judgment against the plain-
tiffs on both their constitutional and statutory claims. In ruling
for the defendants, the court noted that the plaintiffs had never
claimed intentional discrimination. Rather, the plaintiffs had al-
leged only that Test 21 had a discriminatory impact on black
applicants and bore no relationship to job performance.8 2
On appeal, the plaintiffs contended that their summary
judgment motion, which raised only the constitutional due process
issue, should have been granted. The court of appeals reversed
the trial court judgment and ordered the lower court to grant the
plaintiffs' summary judgment motion.83 The appellate court
reached this decision by applying the Griggs disproportionate im-
pact standard for Title VII claims to the constitutional due pro-
cess issue in the case at bar. 4  Under this standard, the defen-
dants' lack of discriminatory intent in designing and administering
Test 21, the court held, was irrelevant.8 5
The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, holding
that it had erroneously applied the statutory standard of racial
discrimination to a constitutional claim.8 6  Title VII dispropor-
tionate impact proof, the Court declared, does not suffice to
prove unconstitutional racial discrimination. For a constitutional
government of the District of Columbia, no officer or employee of the govern-
ment of the District of Columbia shall exclude or give preference to the resi-
dents of the District of Columbia or any State of the United States on the basis
of residence, religion, race, color, or national origin.
80 426 U.S. at 233-34.
81 Id. at 235.
82 Davis v. Washington, 348 F. Supp. 15, 16 (D.D.C. 1972), rev'd, 512 F.2d 956 (D.C.
Cir. 1975), rev'd, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
83 Davis v. Washington, 512 F.2d 956 (D.C. Cir. 1975), rev'd, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
84 See 512 F.2d. at 957 n.2 ("decisions applying Title VII furnish additional instruction
as to the legal standard governing the issues raised in this case").
85 Id. at 960-61.
88 426 U.S. at 238.
[Vol. 65:1
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
claim of racial discrimination, the Court concluded, a plaintiff
must prove discriminatory intent, not just statistical dispropor-
tionate impact, to establish a prima facie case and subject the
employer's action to strict scrutiny.8 7 Absent proof of discrimina-
tory purpose, the Court will review the alleged racial classification
under the toothless"" rational basis test.8 9
The Washington decision, requiring proof of discriminatory
intent for the plaintiff's prima facie case in all constitutional
claims of employment discrimination, could dramatically restrict
future employment discrimination claims. This opinion thus de-
serves careful scrutiny. Although many scholars have discussed its
relation to constitutional jurisprudence9 0 few have considered
Washington's potential impact on statutory claims of employment
discrimination.
B. Constitutional Analysis
By requiring the plaintiff in employment discrimination ac-
tions under the Constitution to prove the difficult issue of dis-
criminatory intent in his prima facie case, the Washington Court
impeded the enforcement of constitutionally guaranteed civil
rights. Imposing this stringent standard is not the only significant
aspect of the Court's decision; the Court's reasoning is equally
troubling, particularly because of the Court's disingenuous treat-
ment of its own precedent.
The Washington Court gave two reasons for its rejection of the
disproportionate impact theory. First, the Court declared that its
7 Id. at 238-39, 242, 245. The Court recently extended the intent requirement to a
constitutional claim of sex discrimination. See Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 99 S. Ct. 2282,
2293 (1979).
The Washington Court conceded that such extreme disproportionate impact cases as,
for example, systematic exclusion of blacks from jury service may be enough to demonstrate
discriminatory intent. 426 U.S. at 241-42 (dictum).
See generally Friedman, supra note 5, at 533-534, 550, 560 & n.174.
89 426 U.S. at 247-48. Accord, Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 99 S. Ct. 2282, 2292-93
(1979) (dictum).
'o See, e.g., Brest, Forward: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARV. L. REv.
1 (1976); Eisenberg, Disproportionate Impact and Illicit Motive: Theories of Constitutional Adjudi-
cation, 52 N.Y.U. L. REv. 36 (1977); Perry, The Disproportionate Impact Theory of Racial Dis-
crimination, 125 U. PA. L. REv. 540 (1977); Samford, Toward A Constitutional Definition of
Racial Discrimination, 25 EMORY L.J. 509 (1976); Note, Burden of Proof in Equal Protection
Discriminatory Impact Cases: An Emerging Standard, 26 CATH. U.L. REv. 815 (1977); Note,
Discriminatory Purpose: What It Means Under the Equal Protection Clause-Washington v. Dams,
26 DEPAUL L. REv. 650 (1979); Comment, Proof of Racially Discriminatory Purpose Under the
Equal Protection Clause: Washington v. Davis, Arlington Heights, Mt. Healthy, and Wil-
liamsburgh, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 725 (1977).
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prior opinions did not support applying the Griggs theory to a
constitutionally-based cause of action.91 Second, the Court feared
that adoption of the statutory standard would lead to the invalida-
tion of "a whole range" of statutes and regulations "designed to
serve neutral ends." 9 2  Neither of these explanations can with-
stand serious scrutiny.
The Court reached its conclusion that prior cases did not
support the application of disproportionate impact theory to con-
stitutional claims only by misinterpreting its own contrary prece-
dent as reflecting a uniform position on the roles of impact and
intent in constitutional litigation.93
We have never held that the constitutional standard for ad-
judicating claims of invidious racial discrimination is identical to
the standards applicable under Title VII ....
... [O]ur cases have not embraced the proposition that a
law or other official act, without regard to whether it reflects a
racially discriminatory purpose, is unconstitutional solely because
it has a racially disproportionate impact.94
Yet in at least three prior cases, the Court had invalidated a
statute or other official action exclusively because of its dis-
criminatory effects. For example, in Gomillion v. Lightfoot,95 the
Court struck down an Alabama statute gerrymandering the bound-
aries of Tuskegee because it deprived the city's black residents of
their fifteenth amendment right to vote. Justice Frankfurter de-
clared that this redistricting could not pass constitutional muster
because its "inevitable effect" 96 was to disenfranchise only black
voters. The Court did not directly examine the city's purpose in
drafting this legislation.9 7
Several years later, in United States v. O'Brien,98 the Court
reemphasized the importance of impact analysis to the Gomillion
91 426 U.S. at 239.
92 Id. at 248.
93 See Eisenberg, supra note 90, at 39; Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in
Constitutional Law, 79 YALE L. J. 1205, 1254 (1970); Perry, supra note 90, at 544; Comment,
supra note 90, at 730 n.28.
94 426 U.S. at 239.
9- 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
96 Id. at 341 (emphasis added).
117 Although Justice Frankfurter may have implicitly considered the city's motives (see
Perry, supra note 90, at 545 n.32), the statute's discriminatory impact sufficed to render it
unconstitutional.
98 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
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decision. The O'Brien Court characterized Gomillion as standing
"not for the proposition that legislative motive is a proper basis
for declaring a statute unconstitutional, but that the inevitable ef-
fect of a statute on its face may render it unconstitutional."a-
Neither Gomillion nor O'Brien, however, received mention by the
Washington Court.
Another case conflicting with Washington is Palmer v.
Thompson. 00 In that case, the city of Jackson, Mississippi had de-
cided to close its segregated public swimming pools after being
ordered to open its public facilities to all races. Black residents
filed suit under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment to force the city to reopen the pools. The Court re-
jected this plea, holding that the closing did not affect blacks and
whites differently. Although the record contained evidence sup-
porting a claim of discriminatory intent, 101 the Court upheld the
city's action because of the absence of any discriminatory impact
upon blacks.1 0 2 Referring to Gomillion, inter alia, the Court reiter-
ated that "the focus in those cases was on the actual effect of the
enactments, not upon the motivation which led the States to be-
have as they did." 103
Rather than openly rejecting this essential portion of Palmer,
the Washington Court feebly attempted to circumvent Palmer's un-
ambiguous language. Although the Court conceded that Palmer
indicated that legislative intent was not a sine qua non for a con-
stitutional right of action,'10 4 it maintained that the decision really
turned on unrebutted evidence of a legitimate purpose behind the
pool closings.' 0 5
This description, unfortunately, misrepresents Palmer. In that
case, the Court clearly stated that the record contained evidence
supporting both the plaintiff's allegation of a discriminatory pur-
pose and defendant's assertion of a legitimate desire to preserve
peace and order. 06 More to the point, the Court held that the
likelihood of such multiple motivation demonstrated the futility of
reviewing legislation for the intent of its proponents.' 0 7 The
99 Id. at 384.
100 403 U.S. 217 (1971).
001 Id. at 224-25.
102 But see Brest, supra note 90, at 27.
103 403 U.S. at 225.
104 426 U.S. at 242, 244 n.ll.
105 Id. at 243.




Palmer Court thus had refused to base its decision on intent, rely-
ing instead on the lack of any discriminatory impact. 108
In addition, the Washington Court misrepresented the holding
in Wright v. Council of the City of Emporia.0 9 When the city of
Emporia, which had affiliated with the school system of its county,
sought to set up its own separate system, the plaintiffs challenged
the city's action under the equal protection clause of the four-
teenth amendment." 0 The Fourth Circuit reversed the trial
court's judgment for the plaintiffs, holding that the validity of the
city's conduct depended on the "dominant purpose" I1 1 behind the
challenged action. This dominant purpose test was repudiated by
the Supreme Court. Citing Palmer for support, the Court found
no precedent for this standard.' 12  Moreover, the Court added
that:
[An inquiry into the "dominant" motivation of school au-
thorities is as irrelevant as it is fruitless .... Thus, we have fo-
cused upon the effect-not the purpose or motivation-of a
school board's action in determining whether it is a permissible
method of dismantling a dual system. The existence of a per-
missible purpose cannot sustain an action that has an impermis-
sible effect." 3
Thus, it concluded that the trial court had correctly focused on
the effect of the city's action rather than upon the motivation be-
hind it."14
The Washington Court's treatment of City of Emporia is the de-
cision's most enigmatic aspect. After stating that discriminatory ef-
fect had never been the constitutional standard for adjudicating
100 Id. at 225.
109 407 U.S. at 451 (1972).
"10 The City of Emporia lawsuit began in 1965 when an action was filed on behalf of black
children against Greenville County officials. The plaintiffs sought to enjoin continuation of
the county's racially segregated school system. On June 25, 1969, the district court ordered
the county to implement a desegregation plan which the plaintiffs had submitted. Two
weeks later, the Emporia City Council declared its intention to operate its own separate
school system. On August 1, 1969, the plaintiffs filed a supplemental complaint against
members of the Emporia City Council and School Board seeking to enjoin the creation of
this independent school system. The Supreme Court's opinion deals only with the supple-
mental complaint. 407 U.S. at 455-58.
"' Wright v. Council of City of Emporia, 442 F.2d 570, 572 (4th Cir. 1971), rev'd, 407
U.S. 451 (1972).
112 407 U.S. at 461-62.




claims of racial discrimination, the Court conceded that City of
Emporia represents an instance where "the racial impact of a law,
rather than its discriminatory purpose, is the critical factor." 115 It
then distinguished City of Emporia by suggesting that the prior case
rested not upon the adjudication of a constitutional question but
rather on the effect that the city's action would have had on a
prior federal judicial decree ;116 the Court focused 117 on language
in City of Emporia that there was no need to find an "independent
constitutional violation.""" 8  Yet, the City of Emporia Court had
acknowledged that the district court's decision to enjoin the de-
fendant's proposed withdrawal from the county school stemmed
from a finding of a constitutional violation.1 19
Finally, the Washington Court misinterpreted the discussion in
City of Emporia concerning the need for an " 'independent' con-
stitutional violation." That statement does not mean that the case
rests on nonconstitutional grounds. The lack of independence re-
ferred to the claim against both the city and the county rather
than the separateness of the constitutional claim from another
claim. As City of Emporia indicates, the Court treated the two
municipalities as one unit.1 20  Because a single constitutional
charge could serve as the basis for review of the actions of both
city and county, an independent claim under the fourteenth
amendment against the city was unnecessary to raise a constitu-
tional question about the city's withdrawal decision.
Not only did the Washington Court ignore or ineffectually dis-
tinguish its own precedent, 121 it also summarily dismissed deci-
sions by several courts of appeals and district courts holding that
proof of disproportionate impact alone sufficed to establish un-
constitutional racial discrimination. 22  The Court rejected this
I's 426 U.S. at 243.
116 Id.
117 Id.
118 407 U.S. at 459.
"9 423 U.S. at 243. Moreover, the trial judge in City of Emporia had characterized the
plaintiffs' complaint as seeking to protect their "constitutional right to unsegregated public
education." 309 F. Supp. 671, 676 (E.D. Va. 1970), rev'd, 442 F.2d 570 (4th Cir. 1971),
reu'd, 407 U.S. 451 (1972).
120 407 U.S. at 459-60.
121 See Eisenberg, supra note 90, at 46.
222 426 U.S. at 244-45 & n.12. See generally Note, supra note 90, 26 CATH. U.L. REv. at
817-18; Note, supra note 90, 26 DE PAUL L. Rv. at 658; Note, Racial Discrimination Under the
Constitution and Title VII-More Deference to the Reasonable Practices of Launnakers and Employers,
37 LA. L. REV. 973, 977 n.26 (1977).
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overwhelming body of case law by noting simply that such cases
"demonstrate that there is another side to the issue." 123
The Court's cavalier treatment of both its own opinions, as
well as those of a preponderance of the circuits, becomes more
troubling when one considers that the Court undertook this con-
stitutional inquiry on its own motion.124  The defendants never
challenged the applicability of the statutory disproportionate im-
pact standard to plaintiff's constitutional right of action. They ar-
gued only that the appellate court had misapplied the Griggs
test.125
In addition to its disingenuous use of precedent, 1 26 the
Washington Court gave only one reason of substance for its deci-
sion: application of the statutory impact standard to constitutional
claims, the Court maintained, could invalidate a wide range of
well-intentioned legislation.' 27  But this postulate incorrectly as-
sumes that the discriminatory consequences of a facially neutral
practice are less offensive than discrimination generated by a hos-
tile motive. Equally undesirable societal costs result from both in-
tentional and unintentional discrimination. Whatever the cause,
differential treatment, and the diminished contact among races
that it engenders, reinforces prejudices and stereotypes, creates
feelings of inferiority and superiority, deprives individuals of im-
portant benefits, perpetuates fear and hostility, and impedes un-
derstanding and cooperation. 28
Such deviation from the ideal of equality inherent in the
constitutional guarantee of equal protection should not be tol-
erated. 129 The Washington Court erred: the effect that the dis-
proportionate impact standard would have on statutes hardly con-
stitutes a persuasive reason for scrutinizing disciminatory public
action less rigorously when proof of discriminatory intent is lacking.
The Court's insensitivity to unintentional discrimination will only
123 426 U.S. at 245.
124 Id. at 238.
125 Id. at 238 n.8.
126 See text accompanying notes 95-120 supra.
127 Id. at 248.
128 See Brest, supra note 90, at 29; Goodman, De Facto School Segregation: A Constitutional
and Empirical Analysis, 60 CALIF. L. REv. 275, 299-300 (1972); Perry, supra note 90, at 558
n.99.
129 See Eisenberg, supra note 90, at 81.
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perpetuate the demoralizing and stigmatizing impact of official ac-
tion that produces disproportionate exclusionary consequences.
Washington's significance, however, extends beyond the flaws
in the Court's reasoning. First, making intent a necessary element
of the prima facie case in constitutional claims of employment dis-
crimination sharply restricts the effectiveness of the Constitution
as a means of advancing such claims. In addition, the Court's im-
position of the stringent intent standard in constitutional cases
may spawn a reconsideration and reformulation of the standard
by which it judges statutory rights of' action.
C. The Impact on Constitutional Litigation
The Washington ruling immediately threatened the viability of
the Constitution as a basis for employment discrimination suits. As
with plaintiffs claiming a violation of Title VII, plaintiffs with
constitutional claims greatly benefit from the disproportionate
impact standard because they can establish a prima facie case
without any direct evidence of defendant's discriminatory in-
tent. 3"' Washington, of course, extinguished that benefit by re-
130 See notes 57-75 and accompanying text supra. In Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422
U.S. 405, 425-32 (1975), the Court elaborated on the defendant's heavy burden to rebut
the plaintiff's showing of disproportionate impact and prove that its employment policy
was job-related. The Washington Court significantly diminished this burden of proof. In
addition to requiring proof of intent in the plaintiff's prima facie case, the Court held that
defendants were entitled to summary judgment on the plaintiff's statutory claims. The
opinion stated that the plaintiff could not prevail on his claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and
D.C. CODE § 1-320 because Test 21 satisfied the applicable statutory standard of job-
relatedness. 426 U.S. at 248-52. Although the plaintiff did not file an action under Title
VII, the Court further noted both that the defendants did not dispute the applicability of
Title VII job-relatedness standards to the plaintiff's claims under § 1981 and the municipal
statute, and that the trial court had assumed that Title VII criteria controlled the case. Id.
at 249. The Court concluded that the defendants had satisfied the Title VII requirement
of job-relatedness by showing a correlation between success on Test 21 and adequate per-
formance in the police recruit training course. Id. at 248-52. The Court ruled that the
court of appeals had held defendants to an unnecessarily strict standard in invalidating
Test 21 because the defendants failed to prove a relationship between success on the
examination and actual performance as a police officer. A positive relationship between
test and training course performance, the Court held, validated the exam, and the defen-
dants were not obliged to produce evidence of any relationship to actual performance on
the job. Id. at 249-50.
Justice Brennan, dissenting, points out the clear inconsistency of this result with the
requirement articulated in Griggs and Albemarle that defendant prove the job-relatedness of
its practices. 426 U.S. at 266-67. This inconsistency stands out, in particular, because the
record disclosed no persuasive evidence that training course performance related to on-
the-job performance. The majority's refusal to recognize this incongruity and its suggestion
that its definition of defendant's burden was not "foreclosed by either Griggs or Albemarle"
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quiring that plaintiff prove intent as part of the prima facie case
in constitutional cases.
Intent, like all states of mind, is a subjective condition that
does not lend itself to clear and persuasive proof. The inherent
difficulty in demonstrating any subjective motivation will often
prove insurmountable. Thus, genuine victims of discrimination
could be foreclosed from redressing their injuries, particularly in
situations involving governmental action. In such instances, the
decisionmaking authority frequently is dispersed among so many
individuals that direct evidence of the actual motivation underly-
ing a particular decision may defy discovery.' 31 Moreover, the
knowledge that intent is an essential element of any potential
litigant's case may encourage official decisionmakers to take the
simple steps necessary to camouflage their true intentions.132
Because of Washington, many deserving plaintiffs who could
offer proof of the discriminatory consequences of the govern-
ment's conduct, but cannot confirm the presence of intent, will be
forced to abandon their reliance on the Constitution and look to
alternative sources of relief. Unfortunately, the unspoken message
of Washington may produce repercussions extending far beyond
the constitutional boundaries of that particular case.
D. The Impact on Statutory Causes of Action
The Washington Court addressed the role of intent in
employment discrimination litigation only with respect to plain-
tiff's constitutional claim. Although the decision did not deal di-
rectly with this issue in its statutory context, the pro-defendant
tenor of this case has caused many federal courts to reconsider
the standards they traditionally applied to actions brought under
the federal antidiscrimination statutes. Several of these courts
have applied Washington's intent requirement to employment dis-
crimination actions brought under the Civil Rights Acts of 1866
and 1964. Both the legislative histories of the two statutes and the
reasoning employed in these wayward opinions, however, indicate
that such an extension of the Washington holding is un-
(id. at 251), indicate the Burger Court's increasingly generous treatment of defendants in
employment discrimination actions. See generally Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination
Through Anti-Discrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV.
1049, 1114 (1978).
131 See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 253 (1976) (concurring opinion, Stevens, J.).
132 See Shutran & Jones, Civil Rights, 1977 ANN. SURVEY AM. L. 691, 720.
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warranted-a showing of disproportionate exclusionary impact
should continue to suffice in establishing a prima facie case in
such suits.
1. Title VII Actions
Because the plaintiffs in Washington did not assert a Title VII
claim, and strong Supreme Court rulings oppose an intent re-
quirement in Title VII actions against private employers, 1 3 the
lower federal courts have not attempted to append such a re-
quirement onto the prima facie case in those actions. 134 The
courts have, however, disagreed whether the Washington decision
should affect the nature of the plaintiff's prima facie case when
the defendant is a public body. 35
Title VII was amended by the Equal Employment Opportu-
nity Act of 1972.136 One of the most significant changes con-
tained in the new enactment was the extension of Title VII's
coverage to federal, state and local government employers.13 7
After the ruling in Washington, litigants asked the courts to
reexamine the issue of whether a single standard should control
both statutory and constitutional claims of employment bias in the
public sector.
Proponents of an intent requirement for Title VII actions
against governments rely on the constitutional foundation of the
1972 amendments as their principal support. They contend that
the Constitution does not permit imposition of the Griggs impact
133 The Court has spoken against such a requirement, both before Washington (see, e.g.,
Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 422 (1975); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401
U.S. 424, 432 (1971)), as well as after Washington (see, e.g., New York City Transit Auth. v.
Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 584 (1979); Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136, 141 (1977);
Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329 (1977); Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States,
433 U.S. 299, 307-08 (1977); International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S.
324, 335-36 & n.15 (1977); General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 137 (1976)).
134 See, e.g., Rule v. International Ass'n of Bridge Workers, 568 F.2d 558, 566 (8th Cir.
1977); Yuhas v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Co., 562 F.2d 496, 498 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435
U.S. 934 (1978); Kinsey v. First Regional Sec., Inc., 557 F.2d 830, 839 (D.C. Cir. 1977);
Gibson v. Local 40, Supercargoes & Checkers, 543 F.2d 1259, 1265 (9th Cir. 1976); Heiser,
Intent v. Impact: The Standard of Proof Necessary to Establish a Prima Facie Case of Race Dis-
crimination Under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, 16 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 207, 224 n.94 (1979).
135 One trial judge completely switched sides on this issue within just nine months. Com-
pare United States v. Virginia, 454 F. Supp. 1077, 1082-84 (E.D. Va. 1978) (proof of impact
alone sufficient to establish prima facie case against police department) with Friend v.
Leidinger. 446 F. Supp. 361, 386 (E.D. Va. 1977) (proof of discriminatory purpose held
necessary to establish prima facie case against fire department), aff'd, 588 F.2d 61 (4th Cir.
1978).
136 Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 11, 86 Stat. 111 (1972).
137 See generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(b), 2000e-16 (1976).
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standard on governmental agencies. Congress, they reason,
enacted this statute under section 5 of the fourteenth amendment,
and because Washington requires proof of discriminatory purpose
for a claim under the fourteenth amendment, an action brought
under a statute enacted pursuant to that amendment also must be
reviewed under the same intent standard. 138
This proposition rests on the premise that a statute cannot
exceed the scope of the constitutional provision from which it de-
rives its authority. Under this theory, a statute cannot constitu-
tionally proscribe state action its constitutional progenitor would
permit. Although the Supreme Court has recognized that Con-
gress passed the 1972 amendment to implement section 5 of the
fourteenth amendment, 139 it also has rejected claims that other
statutes enacted under this amendment cannot exceed its limita-
tions. 140
In Katzenbach v. Morgan, 41 for example, a federal statute
prohibited certain uses of literacy tests to assess voter quali-
fications. The Court noted that this law was enacted pursuant to
section 5 of the fourteenth amendment and that it had ruled
previously that the use of such literacy tests did not violate that
constitutional provision. Nevertheless, the constitutionality of a
federal act barring the use of constitutionally permissible literacy
tests was upheld as a legitimate exercise of Congress' authority
under the enabling clause of the fourteenth amendment.1 42  The
Court explained that Congress, under section 5, may enact any
"appropriate legislation" designed to enforce the equal protection
guarantees of the fourteenth amendment.1 43  The constitutional
test for any exercise of that power is whether the statute is
,'38 See Armour v. City of Anniston, 19 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1755, 1759 (N.D. Ala.
1977), aff'd, 597 F.2d 46, 48 n.2 (5th Cir. 1979); Friend v. Leidinger, 446 F. Supp. 361,
386 (E.D. Va. 1977), aJf'd, 588 F.2d 61 (4th Cir. 1978); Blake v. City of Los Angeles, 435
F. Supp. 55, 63 (C.D. Cal. 1977), rev'd, 595 F.2d 1367, 1377 (9th Cir. 1979); Scott v. City of
Anniston, 430 F. Supp. 508, 515 (N.D. Ala. 1977), rev'd in part, 597 F.2d 897, 898-900 (5th
Cir. 1979); Perry, supra note 90, at 573 n.148.
'3' See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 447, 453 n.9 (1976). See also H.R. REP. No.
233, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1971); S. REP. No. 413, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. 10 (1971).
140 See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 650-51 (1966); U.S. v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745,
781-84 (1966) (concurring and dissenting opinion, Brennan, J.). Cf. Jones v. Alfred H.
Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 439 (1968) (discussing thirteenth amendment).
,4, 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
142 Id. at 648-49.
,13 Id. at 650-51.
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"plainly adapted" to carrying out the objectives of the amendment
and is consistent with the letter and spirit of the Constitution.1
44
Furthermore, the Court emphasized that the scope of judicial re-
view is limited by the discretion granted Congress to determine
what legislation is necessary to secure the protections provided by
the fourteenth amendment.1
45
Extension of the Griggs impact standard to actions brought
under the 1972 amendments comports with this constitutional
standard. The legislative history of that enactment demonstrates
that Congress intended to provide public employees with all the
protections against discrimination afforded private sector
employees by the 1964 Act. 146  Granting these safeguards to gov-
ernment workers clearly supplements and implements the anti-
discrimination guarantees of the equal protection clause and falls
within the discretion accorded Congress to make such determina-
tions. 147  Thus, since adoption of an impact standard in this con-
text rationally relates to enforcement of the equal protection
clause and agrees with the letter and spirit of the Constitution,
the enactment of a statute amenable to such an interpretation




146 See Chandler v. Roudebush, 425 U.S. 840, 841 (1976); note 150 infra.
147 See Scott v. City of Anniston, 597 F.2d 897, 900 (5th Cir. 1979); Blake v. City of Los
Angeles, 595 F.2d 1367, 1373 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v. City of Chicago, 573 F.2d
416, 423-24 (7th Cir. 1978); Pennsylvania v. Rizzo, 466 F. Supp. 1219, 1227 (E.D. Pa.
1979).
148 Some courts have suggested that imposition of the impact standard upon state and
local government would impermissibly interfere with a state's ability to govern itself. Citing
the Supreme Court's opinion in National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976),
adherents of this view claim that such a result would violate the notions of federalism
contained within the tenth amendment. See Friend v. Leidinger, 446 F. Supp. 361, 386
(E.D. Va. 1977), aff'd, 588 F.2d 61 (4th Cir. 1978). Cf Scott v. City of Anniston, 430 F.
Supp. 508, 515 (N.D. Ala. 1977) (if impact standard conflicts with Usery under tenth
amendment analysis, standard also conflicts with Washington under fourteenth amend-
ment), rev'd in part, 597 F.2d 897, 898-900 (5th Cir. 1979). Usery and tenth amendment
analysis, however, are inapposite in this context. Usery clearly limited Congress' authority
under the commerce clause to regulate conduct by the states. The 1972 amendments to
Title VII, unlike the amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act in Usery, were enacted
under the fourteenth amendment and not the commerce clause. Thus, the tenth amend-
ment does not preclude such an extension of Griggs to public employee actions. See Scott v.
City of Anniston, 597 F.2d 897, 900 (5th Cir. 1979); Blake v. City of Los Angeles, 595
F.2d 1367, 1373 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v. City of Chicago, 573 F.2d 416, 424 (7th
Cir. 1978); Firefighters Institute for Racial Equality v. City of St. Louis, 549 F.2d 506, 510
n.5 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 819 (1977); Pennsylvania v. Rizzo, 466 F. Supp. 1219,
1228 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
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Moreover, the Supreme Court in Dothard v. Rawlinson,149 a
post-Washington Title VII sex discrimination action against a state
board of corrections, rejected the defendant's request that its
statutorily-imposed minimum height and weight requirements be
judged by a standard different than that applied to private
employers. Reviewing the legislative history of the 1972 amend-
ment, the Court concluded that "Congress expressly indicated the
intent that the same Title VII principles be applied to gov-
ernmental and private employers alike." 150 This language, when
coupled with the Court's continued support of impact analysis in
private sector actions,151 indicates that Washington does not fore-
close the applicability of Griggs to discrimination claims leveled
against public employers.
A decision rendered by the Court between Washington and
Dothard, however, has led some commentators to doubt that the
Griggs standard applies in actions against public employers.1 52  In
General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, "53 a class of women employees sued
their employer under Title VII. They alleged that the defendant
engaged in unlawful sex discrimination by excluding pregnancy
benefit payments from the coverage of its comprehensive nonoc-
cupational sickness and accident insurance plan. While this action
was pending before the Fourth Circuit, the Supreme Court de-
cided Geduldig v. Aiello.154  In that case, the plaintiffs unsuccess-
fully attacked a similarly limited disability benefits program. The
disability insurance plan in Geduldig was created by California law,
and the plaintiffs rested their claim of unlawful sex discrimination
on an alleged violation of the equal protection -clause of the four-
teenth amendment. The Court in Gilbert faced the issue of
149 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
15o Id. at 331-32 & n.14. The Court was speaking about the scrutiny appropriate for the
defense of business necessity, not the nature of plaintiff's prima facie case. But the Court's
divination of the legislative intent behind enactment of the 1972 amendments is equally
applicable in the latter context. See Vanguard Justice Soc'y v. Hughes, 471 F. Supp. 670,
701 (D. Md. 1979). Congress clearly knew of the Griggs impact standard and could have
excluded its application to public employee suits when it passed the 1972 amendments.
The absence of any language in the amendments suggesting a separate standard for ac-
tions against governments further supports the view that Congress intended the dispro-
portionate impact theory to prevail in all Title VII cases. See United States v. City of
Chicago, 573 F.2d 416, 422 (7th Cir. 1978).
'5' See note 133 supra.
152 See Edwards, supra note 5, at 13, 21-22; Hsia, The Effects Test: New Directions, 17
SANTA CLARA LAw. 777, 789 (1977).
153 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
154 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
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whether the constitutional determination in Geduldig disposed of
the statutory question in the case at bar.155
Justice Rehnquist, through a masterful display of semantic
sleight-of-hand, ultimately concluded that the constitutional
determination in Geduldig controlled and that the employer's ex-
clusion of pregnancy from its list of covered disabilities did not
violate Title VII. After acknowledging that there is "no necessary
inference" that the statutory standard should be identical to the
constitutional concept of discrimination, 156 Justice Rehnquist de-
clared that constitutional decisions are a "useful starting point" in
resolving statutory claims.' 57  Immediately, and without explana-
tion, the statutory and constitutional standards of discrimination
were then described as "not wholly dissimilar" 158 and the decision
in Geduldig turned from "quite relevant" 159 to "precisely in
point." 160 Therefore, Justice Rehnquist concluded that because
California's exclusion of pregnancy from its disability plan did not
amount to unconstitutional sex discrimination, General Electric's
similarly restricted insurance policy did not violate the statutory
ban on sex discrimination. 1 6
The Gilbert Court's equation of the constitutional and statu-
tory definitions of sex discrimination, however, does not mean
that intent must be a requisite element of the prima facie case in
statutory as well as constitutional claims of discrimination. Gilbert
never discussed the role of intent in plaintiff's initial burden of
proof under either of these two rights of action. It stopped short
of deciding whether the employer intended to discriminate be-
cause it held that the employer's plan in fact did not discriminate
against women on the basis of sex. 16 2  The Court only decided
the threshold issue of whether a sex-based classification was
created by the- employer's failure to include pregnancy as a com-
pensable disability. Only for this issue-the existence of sex-based
differential treatment-not the necessity of proving discrimina-
tory purpose, did the Court adopt a coterminous standard for the
two types of claims. 163 To the contrary, the Court admitted that





160 Id. at 136.
161 Id. at 145-46.
162 Id. at 139-40.
163 Moreover, the separate opinions of Justices Stewart, Blackmun, and Brennan em-
phasized their belief that Gilbert did not impair the continued viability of the Griggs impact
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a Title VII action could be predicated upon a showing of dis-
criminatory effect.' 64 The plaintiffs could not secure a judgment
because the Court found that the employer's plan did not gener-
ate any discriminatory impact on women. 165  This analysis of Gil-
bert, especially when considered in light of the Dothard Court's
subsequent statement, reveals that the Court has not foreclosed
application of the Griggs impact standard to public or private
employee suits under Title VII. 1
66
Although the Supreme Court has hampered constitutional
plaintiffs by adding an intent requirement to their prima facie
case in public employment discrimination, courts should continue
to allow Title VII plaintiffs to make out a prima facie case with a
showing of disproportionate impact. This result would fulfill
Congress' intention to give plaintiffs suing public employers the
same benefits under Title VII that plaintiffs suing private
employers already enjoyed. The otherwise restrictive Supreme
Court decisions have not foreclosed this interpretation of Title
VII. In any event, an expansion of the Washington intent require-
ment beyond its constitutional context would unfairly expose
more citizens to irremediable, invidious discrimination and under-
cut the spirit of a statute designed to promote equal employment
opportunity. 16 7
standard, Id. at 146 (concurring opinion, Stewart, J.); id. (concurring 'opinion, Blackmun,
J.); id. at 154-56 (dissenting opinion, Brennan, J.).
164 Id. at 136-37.
165 Id. See Love v. Waukesha Joint School Dist. #1, 560 F.2d 285, 288 (7th Cir.
1977); Sirota, Sex Discrimination: Title VII and the Bona Fide Occupational Qualiflcation, 55
TEXAs L. REv. 1025, 1038 (1977).
166 Courts have frequently held Griggs applicable to public employee Title VII actions.
See, e.g., Blake v. City of Los Angeles, 595 F.2d 1367, 1373-74 (9th Cir. 1979); Association
Against Discrimination v. City of Bridgeport, 594 F.2d 306, 308-09 (2d Cir. 1979); United
States v. City of Chicago, 573 F.2d 416, 421-24 (7th Cir. 1978); Image of Greater San
Antonio v. Brown, 570 F.2d 517, 521 (5th Cir. 1978); Richardson v. Pennsylvania Depart-
ment of Health, 561 F.2d 489, 491 (3d Cir. 1977); Firefighters Institute for Racial Equality
v. City of St. Louis, 549 F.2d 506, 510 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 819 (1977); Van-
guard Justice Soc'y v. Hughes, 471 F. Supp. 670, 699-700 (D. Md. 1979); Allen v. City of
Mobile, 464 F. Supp. 433 (S.D. Ala. 1978); United States v. City of Buffalo, 457 F. Supp.
612, 618-19 (W.D.N.Y. 1978); United States v. Virginia, 454 F. Supp. 1077, 1082 (E.D. Va.
1978); United States v. South Carolina, 445 F. Supp. 1094, 1111 (D.S.C. 1977), aff'd mem.,
434 U.S. 1026 (1978).
167 See United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 99 S. Ct. 2721, 2727-28 (1979).
This position derives additional support from post-Washington development of the law
in a related area. In Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development
Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977), the village's denial of respondent's request to rezone some land
from single-family to multiple-family classification was challenged as violative of the vil-
lage's obligations under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment and the
Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1976). See generally Smedley, A Com-
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2. The Civil Rights Act of 1866
Supplementing Title VII, section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of
1866 168-currently codified at 42 U.S.C. § 198 1-offers an addi-
tional federal avenue of redress for victims of employment dis-
crimination. This statute currently plays a significant role in the
achievement of the nation's goal of equal employment opportu-
nity.169 But the problems that the Washington decision might pose
parative Analysis of Title VIII and Section 1982, 22 VAND. L. REv. 459 (1969); Note, The
Federal Fair Housing Requirements: Title VIII of the 1968 Civil Rights Act, 1969 DUKE L. J. 733;
Note, The Fair Housing Act of 1968: Its Success and Failure, 9 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 1312
(1975). Relying on its holding in Washington, the Court ruled that the plaintiff was required
to offer proof of the village's racially discriminatory purpose to prevail on its constitutional
cause of action. 429 U.S. at 264-65. As the appellate court had ruled in favor of the plain-
tiff on its constitutional claim but had not addressed the statutory count (id. at 271), the
Supreme Court remanded the case to the Seventh Circuit for resolution of that issue. 429
U.S. at 271.
The Fair Housing Act, enacted as Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, guaran-
tees to all persons the right not to be denied a dwelling on the basis of race, religion, sex
or national origin. This portion of the Act provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
[Ilt shall be unlawful [to] refuse to sell or rent.., or to refuse to negotiate for
the sale or rental of, or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any
person because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (1976).
The village of Arlington Heights contended that the constitutional decision in
Washington should govern the disposition of plaintiff's statutory cause of action. It also
claimed that the use of the phrase "because of race" in the substantive provision of Title
VIII mandated a showing of discriminatory intent to prove a violation of the 1968 statute.
The Seventh Circuit, on remand, rejected both of these claims. The legislative history
of Title VIII, the court reasoned, indicated that Congress intended for this enactment to
be interpreted expansively in order to achieve its broad remedial objectives. The imposition
of an intent requirement, it continued, would be inconsistent with this policy. In addition,
the appellate court noted that the presence of the phrase "because of race" had not pre-
vented the courts from applying an impact standard in Title VII actions. Metropolitan
Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1288-90 (7th Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1025 (1978). Accordingly, the court held that plaintiffs could establish
a prima facie case under Title VIII by producing evidence of the discriminatory conse-
quences of a defendant's actions without making a showing of discriminatory purpose. Id. at
1290. Accord, Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126, 146-47 (3d Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 435 U.S. 908 (1978).
The analysis adopted by the Seventh Circuit, and the legislative histories of the two
respective statutes, demonstrate the close connection between these enactments and
strongly suggest that the refusal to extend the holding in Washington to a statutory count in
the housing context should apply with equal force to suits brought under Title VII. See
Waters v. Heublein, Inc., 547 F.2d 466, 469 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 915
(1977). See generally Comment, supra note 59; Note, Work Environment Injury Under Title VII,
82 YALE L.J. 1695, 1701 (1973).
168 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982 (originally enacted as Act of April 9, 1866, 14 Stat. 27
(1866)), quoted in note 78 supra.
169 See Heiser, Intent v. Impact: The Standard of Proof Necessary to Establish a Prima Fade
Case of Race Discrimination Under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, 16 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 207, 208 n.6
(1979).
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for Title VII suits could easily beset actions brought under this
old, yet similar enactment. If the deleterious effects of that deci-
sion are to be confined to constitutional litigation, section 1981
must remain free of the intent requirement.
In 1968, the Supreme Court revived the previously dormant
section 1981.170 This provision does not expressly forbid
employment discrimination, but it consistently has been inter-
preted to prohibit employment discrimination in private 171 and
nonfederal 172 public 173 employment contracts.
Although the plaintiffs in Washington originally asserted a
claim under section 1981,174 the Washington Court never needed
to decide what elements are required to make out a prima facie
case under section 1981.175 The Court's subsequent opinions
have not disposed of this issue,' 76 but the Court's lack of sym-
pathy for minority civil rights litigants in employment discrimina-
tion litigation 177 could influence lower courts deciding whether a
170 Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 422-37 (1968). AlthoughJones involved
a claim under § 1982, another part of the same original Act, the Court discussed all of
section 1 of the Act, before focusing on the § 1982 claim.
171 See, e.g., McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 285-96 (1976);
Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 461 (1975); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer
Co., 392 U.S. 409, 442 n.78 (1968); Macklin v. Spector Freight Sys., Inc., 478 F.2d 979,
993 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Brady v. Bristol-Myers, Inc., 459 F.2d 621, 623 (8th Cir. 1972);
Sanders v. Dobbs Houses, Inc., 431 F.2d 1097, 1099-1100 (5th Cir. 1970).
172 See, e.g., Brown v. General Servs. Adm'n, 425 U.S. 820, 824-35 (1976) (§ 717 of Title
VII, as amended by § 11 of Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, is exclusive
statutory remedy available to federal employees asserting a claim of employment discrimi-
nation). See generally Reiss, Requiem for an "Independent Remedy": The Civil Rights Acts of 1866
and 1871 as Remedies for Employment Discrimination, 50 S. CAL. L. Rlv. 961, 980-82 (1977).
172 See, e.g., Bridgeport Guardians, Inc. v. Bridgeport Civil Serv. Comm'n, 482 F.2d
1333, 1335 (2d Cir. 1973) (municipal police force), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 991 (1975); Carter
v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315, 322 (8th Cir.) (municipal civil service commission), cert. denied,
406 U.S. 950 (1972); Bulls v. Holmes, 403 F. Supp. 475, 477 (E.D. Va. 1975) (county board
of supervisors). See generally B. ScHi & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 13, at 609; Reiss, supra
note 172, at 975-82.
174 426 U.S. at 233.
175 See text accompanying notes 76-78 supra. In affirming the appellate court's judgment
granting defendants' motions for summary judgment, and thereby ruling that plaintiffs
were not entitled to relief under § 1981 and D.C. CODE § 1-320, the Court examined the
job-relatedness of Test 21. 426 U.S. at 248-52. This issue was not a part of the plaintiffs'
prima facie case, but rather, the defense asserted by the defendants. Without directly de-
ciding whether traditional Title VII analysis should govern the disposition of this defense,
the Court simply noted that neither party disputed the applicability of Title VII standards
and that the trial court had acted under the same assumption. 426 U.S. at 249 & n.15.
176 See, e.g., New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 583 n.24 (1979);
Davis v. County of Los Angeles, 566 F.2d 1334 (9th Cir. 1978), dismissed as moot, 440 U.S.
625 (1979).
177 But see United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 99 S. Ct. 2721. 2726-30 (1979).
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section 1981 action more nearly resembles a claim under Title VII
or the Constitution. 1 78
Prior to Washington, most federal courts perfunctorily applied
traditional Title VII analysis to section 1981 causes of action on
the unspoken assumption that the two statutes required identical
standards of proof.179  Plaintiffs could establish a prima facie case
under either statute merely by showing disproportionate
exclusionary impact. The ruling in Washington, however, has
caused many lower courts to reconsider the appropriate standard
of proof for section 1981 claims.
Three factors bear significantly on whether a section 1981
claim is controlled by the statutory standard of proof articulated
by the Court in Griggs or the constitutional standard announced
in Washington: (1) the constitutional underpinnings of section
1981; (2) its historical and functional relationship to Title VII;
and (3) social policy considerations. None of these criteria point
conclusively to either standard. The combination of all relevant
factors, however, supports the extension of the Griggs impact
theory to actions filed under section 1981 and argues against re-
quiring plaintiffs to prove discriminatory purpose in making out
their prima facie case.
The broad language of section 1981 could accommodate a
construction favoring either the Griggs standard or the Washington
178 In 1871, Congress enacted another of the Reconstruction Civil Rights Acts:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen
of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the de-
privation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action of law, suit in equity,
or other proper proceeding for redress.
Civil Rights Act of 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976)).
Plaintiffs using this statute seek relief from a violation of their constitutional rights;
thus the intent requirement of Washington should apply to such constitutionally-based
claims. Because no independent statutory claim supports such an action, unlike a charge
pressed under § 1981, and the other federal civil rights statutes enacted during this period
do not relate to the employment sphere, further discussion of Washington's impact on
claims brought under the nineteenth century antidiscrimination statutes will be limited to §
1981.
' See, e.g., Chicano Police Officer's Ass'n v. Stover, 526 F.2d 431, 438-39 (10th Cir.
1975); Douglas v. Hampton, 512 F.2d 976, 984-85 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Long v. Ford Motor
Co., 496 F.2d 500, 505-06 (6th Cir. 1974); Harper v. Kloster, 486 F.2d 1134, 1137 (4th
Cir. 1973); Bridgeport Guardians, Inc. v. Members of Bridgeport Civil Serv. Comm'n, 482
F.2d 1333, 1335-37 (2d Cir. 1973); Castro v. Beecher, 459 F.2d 725, 732-33 (1st Cir. 1972);
Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315 (8th Cir. 1971). See generally B. SCHILi & P. GROSSMAN,
supra note 13, at 638. Note, Davis v. Los Angeles: Plaintiff's Burden of Proof Under Section
1981, 9 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REv. 1, 5 (1978-79).
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standard. 8 °  Thus, other guidelines for statutory construction
must provide the answer.
An examination of a statute's historical and constitutional
background often reveals its appropriate interpretation. The
background of section 1981, however, makes this an unusually
difficult, complex, and confusing undertaking. Congress originally
enacted section 1981 as section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of
1866 181 under its authority granted by section 2 of the thirteenth
amendment1 82 to enact legislation enforcing the constitutional
prohibition against slavery. 83 Two years later, the fourteenth
amendment was added to the Constitution. Shortly thereafter, to
ensure the constitutionality of the old Civil Rights Act, 84 Con-
gress reenacted section 1 of that statute in section 18 of the Civil
Rights Act of 1870,185 pursuant to the enabling clause of the four-
teenth amendment. 186  The 1874 recodification of federal statutes
eventually eliminated this duplication,18 7 but section 1981's dual
constitutional parentage has lent support to both sides in the
standard-of-proof controversy. 88
180 See note 78 supra.
181 See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 422 n.28 (1968); Brooks, Use of the
Civil Rights Acts of 1866 and 1871 to Redress Employment Discrimination, 62 CORNELL L. REv.
258, 261-63 (1977).
182 See generally U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 2. Sections 1 and 2 of that amendment
provide:
SECTION 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for
crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United
States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.
SECTION 2. Congress shall have the power to enforce this article by appropriate legisla-
tion.
18' See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 431-35 (1968).
184 See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 436 (1968); Hurd v. Hodge, 334
U.S. 24, 32-33 (1948).
18' Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 114, § 18, 16 Stat. 144. See Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S.
160, 168 n.8 (1976).
186 Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24, 33 (1948). But see Heiser, supra note 169, at 231 n.127.
187 Act of June 20, 1874, ch. 333, 18 Stat., pt. 3, at 113. Both enactments then resided at
24 Rev. Stat. §§ 1977, 1978 (1874). Act of June 22, 1874, 18 Stat., pt. 1, at 348.
18 For more extensive discussions of the legislative history surrounding § 1981, see R.
CARR, FEDERAL PROTECTION OF CIVIL RIGHTS 33-84 (1947); Brooks, supra note 181, at 261-
68; Gressman, The Unhappy History of Civil Rights Legislation, 50 MICH. L. REv. 1323, 1323-
26 (1952); Larson, The Development of Section 1981 As A Remedy for Racial Discrimination in
Private Employment, 7 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 56, 59-63 (1972); Maslow & Robison, Civil
Rights Legislation and the Fight for Equality 1862-1952, 20 U. CHI. L. REV. 363, 367-70 (1953);
Reiss, supra note 172, at 970-92; Note, Section 1981 and Private Discrimination: An Historical
Justification for a Judicial Trend, 40 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1024, 1025-35 (1972); Note, Racial
Discrimination in Employment Under the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 615,
617-21 (1969).
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Proponents of an intent requirement frequently contend that
because section 1981 is a product of the fourteenth amendment,
the standard of proof controlling constitutional claims should also
apply to that section.' 89 Thus, they maintain, as Washington re-
quires plaintiffs to prove discriminatory intent in their prima facie
case in fourteenth amendment actions, an identical requirement
applies to claims filed under section 1981.190
There are two telling responses to this position. First, the
Supreme Court has ruled repeatedly that section 1981 "prohibits
racial discrimination in the making and enforcing of private con-
tracts" 191 that are not subject to fourteenth amendment restric-
tions. In addition, the Court has stated that the primary origin of
section 1981 is the thirteenth amendment. 192
Moreover, as discussed previously regarding the 1972
amendments to Title VII, a federal statute is not necessarily
bound by the same limitations imposed upon the constitutional
provision from which it derives.193  Thus, even ignoring the rel-
189 For courts extending the Washington intent requirement to § 1981 actions without
any explanation, see Scott v. City of Anniston, 597 F.2d 897, 899 (5th Cir. 1979) (dictum);
Donnell v. General Motors Corp., 576 F.2d 1292, 1300 (8th Cir. 1978); Chicano Police
Officer's Ass'n v. Stover, 552 F.2d 918, 920 (10th Cir. 1977); City of Milwaukee v. Saxbe,
546 F.2d 693, 705 (7th Cir. 1976); National Organization for Women v. Waterfront Com-
mission, 460 F. Supp. 84, 87 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), dismissed in part, 19 Empl. Prac. Dec. 9253
(S.D.N.Y. 1979); United States v. City of Buffalo, 457 F. Supp. 612, 618 (W.D.N.Y. 1978).
The Fifth Circuit originally ruled that plaintiffs need not prove discriminatory purpose
in § 1981 claims. Williams v. DeKalb County, 577 F.2d 248, 255-57 (5th Cir. 1978). On
rehearing, however, one of the three members of the panel changed his mind and the
court adopted the position originally advocated by Judge Clark (577 F.2d at 257 (concur-
ring opinion, Clark, J.)) and held that the Washington intent rule applied to § 1981 actions.
Williams v. DeKalb County, 582 F.2d 2, 2-3 (1978) (per curiam). On this issue, Judge
Clark's concurring opinion relied exclusively on the Fifth Circuit's prior decision in Nevett
v. Sides, 571 F.2d 209 (1978). 577 F.2d at 257. Although Nevett contained a § 1981 claim,
as well as fourteenth amendment and § 1983 claims, the Fifth Circuit, in applying
Washington to the standard of proof issue, treated the case solely as a constitutional claim.
571 F.2d at 213 n.3, 217-19. See Williams v. DeKalb County, 577 F.2d 248, 257 n.5 (5th
Cir.), rev'd, 582 F.2d 2 (5th Cir. 1978). Neither the Nevett court nor Judge Clark in DeKalb
County discussed the § 1981 issue in more than cursory fashion. See also Grigsby v. North
Miss. Medical Center, Inc., 586 F.2d 457, 460-61 (5th Cir. 1978).
190 Arnold v. Ballard, 448 F. Supp. 1025, 1028 (N.D. Ohio 1978); Johnson v. Hoffman,
424 F. Supp. 490, 494 (E.D. Mo. 1977), aff'd sub nora. Johnson v. Alexander, 572 F.2d 1219
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 579 (1978).
191 Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 168 (1976) (emphasis added). Accord, Johnson v.
Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 459-60 (1975). Cf. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.,
392 U.S. 409, 436-37 (1968) (§ 1982 construed to cover private contracts).
192 Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 170-71 (1976). See also Pennsylvania v. Local 542,
International Union of Operating Engineers, 469 F. Supp. 329, 400-01 (E.D. Pa. 1978);
Brooks, supra note 181, at 268; Heiser, supra note 169, at 231 n.127.
193 See notes 139-48 and accompanying text supra.
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evant Supreme Court precedent and designating the fourteenth
amendment as section 1981's constitutional parent does not man-
date that a section 1981 action must incorporate the standard of
proof applicable to claims filed under the fourteenth amendment.
On the other hand, a determination that section 1981 derives
from the thirteenth amendment is not conclusive as to the stan-
dard of proof issue. But an examination of the standard of proof
applied to actions under section 1981's companion section, also
enacted pursuant to the thirteenth amendment, reveals that the
Griggs standard is most appropriate for both types of actions.
In addition to that portion which eventually became 42
U.S.C. § 1981, section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 contained
a provision barring racial discrimination in the sale or rental of
property. This language was similarly reenacted in the Civil
Rights Act of 1870 and subsequently recodified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1982.194 In Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., the Supreme Court
held that section 1982 was enacted pursuant to the thirteenth
amendment.195 As with section 1981, however, the language of
section 1982 does not delineate the elements necessary to establish
a prima facie case for violation of its provisions. One court has
found an intent requirement in section 1982.196 This conclusion
stems from the Jones Court's indication that section 1982 prohibits
racially motivated refusals to sell or rent property.197 This trial
court, however, incorrectly interpreted this language as requiring
a showing of discriminatory purpose in section 1982 actions.
The Jones Court never dealt with the standard-of-proof issue
for claims under section 1982. The sole issue under consideration
was whether the statute prohibited private as well as public acts of
discrimination.' 98 Although the Court stated that section 1982
precluded "every racially motivated refusal to sell or rent," 199 it
made this statement in response to the defendants' claim that only
racial discrimination by public officials was within the purview of
section 1982. Only when taken out of this limited context does
such a statement bear any relation to the standard of proof issue.
The Court sought only to ensure that the subject statute was not
improperly restricted to state action.
194 Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 422 n.28 (1968).
195 Id. at 433, 437-38.
196 Lewis v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 440 F. Supp. 949, 964-65 (D. Md. 1977). See also
Heiser, supra note 169, at 235; Note, supra note 179, at 19.
197 392 U.S. at 419-22, 426.
198 Id. at 412-13.
199 Id. at 421-22.
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More important, the plaintiff in Jones asserted only an indi-
vidual claim of disparate treatment. Discriminatory intent is the
essence of such a claim. 20 0 Jones did not involve a charge that the
defendant employed a facially neutral policy producing dis-
criminatory consequences. Accordingly, the Jones Court never
ruled on the separate question of whether a showing of dis-
criminatory impact established a prima facie case under section
1982. Because the Court has not addressed this issue on any sub-
sequent occasion, there is no definitive statement of the proof re-
quired of plaintiffs in section 1982 actions. In contrast, its modern
day counterpart, Title VIII of the 1968 Civil Rights Act, has been
interpreted as being amenable to the Griggs standard of proof.2o 1
Some courts have also contended that the wording of section
1981 so closely tracks the equal protection clause that the statute
requires a showing of intent. Specifically, a comparison of the
guarantee in section 1981 that all persons shall have the same
right "to the full and equal benefit of all laws" 202 with the parallel
language in the fourteenth amendment has led these courts to
conclude that section 1981 should be judged by the constitutional
standard. 203
Proponents of this proposition, however, have not explained
why semantic similarity alone requires identical standards of proof
for two independent laws. In addition, because a statute's cover-
age is not circumscribed by the scope of its constitutional pre-
decessor, its independent interpretation should not be limited by
the interpretation of a similarly worded ancestor.
Although this analysis of section 1981's constitutional origins
does not conclusively resolve the burden of proof controversy,
further insight may be gleaned from a comparison of the provi-
sions of section 1981 and its modern counterpart, Title VII. Be-
cause both of these civil rights statutes address the problem of
employment discrimination, the more extensive body of Title VII
jurisprudence provides an additional source of guidance on the
proof standard applicable to a section 1981 prima facie case. Spe-
cifically, since application of the Griggs princple to Title VII suits
has survived Washington, the Title VII standard should govern
200 See notes 52-56 and accompanying text supra.
201 See Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283,
1289-90 (7th Cir. 1977); note 167 supra.
202 For the complete text of § 1981, see note 78 supra.
203 See Lewis v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 440 F. Supp. 949, 965 (D. Md. 1977); Croker v.
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claims brought under the analogous statute, section 1981. This
follows the in pari materia principle of statutory construction: if
two statutes relate to the same subject matter, they are in pari
materia and the more recently enacted statute controls the in-
terpretation of the prior enactment.2 4
In Johnson v. Railway Express Agency,2 °5 the Court faced the
question of whether the statute of limitations applicable to section
1981 claims was tolled by the start of a Title VII action based on
the same incident. Although the in pari materia rule was not di-
rectly in issue, the Court did examine the relationship between
the two statutes in resolving the question. Noting that the rem-
edies available to Title VII plaintiffs are "co-extensive" 20 6 with
and "related" 20 to those provided by section 1981, and that both
statutes are "directed to most of the same ends, 208 the Court
nevertheless found substantial differences between these two
enactments. 209
The two acts, the Johnson Court mentioned, are not co-
extensive in their coverage.2 10  While Title VII prohibits dis-
crimination on the basis of race, color, sex, national origin, and
religion,21 1 section 1981 has been held inapplicable to claims of
sex,212 religious,213 and national origin214 discrimination. On the
Boeing Co., 437 F. Supp. 1138, 1181 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
204 F. DWARRIS, A GENERAL TREATISE ON STATUTES 189-90 (1871); 2A J. SUTHERLAND,
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 51.03 (4th ed. C. Sands 1973).
202 421 U.S. 454 (1975).
206 Id. at 459 (citing H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1972), reprinted in [1972]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2137, 2154).
207 Id. at 461.
208 Id.
209 Id. For a detailed comparison of § 1981 and Title VII, see Brooks, supra note 181.
210 421 U.S. at 460.
211 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1976).
212 See, e.g., Raether v. Phillips, 401 F. Supp. 1393, 1396 (W.D. Va. 1975); Strunk v.
Western Ky. Univ., 11 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 355, 357 (E.D. Ky. 1975); Rackin v. University
of Pa., 386 F. Supp. 992, 1009 (E.D. Pa. 1974); League of Academic Women v. Regents of
the Univ. of Cal., 343 F. Supp. 636, 638-39 (N.D. Cal. 1972); Fitzgerald v. United
Methodist Community Center, 335 F. Supp. 965, 966 (D. Neb. 1972). But see Parmer v.
National Cash Register Co., 346 F. Supp. 1043, 1047 (S.D. Ohio 1972) (plaintiff stated claim
under §§ 1981 and 1982 for sex discrimination), aff'd per curiam, 503 F.2d 275 (6th Cir.
1974). Cf. Johnson v. City of Cincinnati, 450 F.2d 796, 798 (6th Cir. 1971) (claim of sex
discrimination under §§ 1983 and 1985(3) not preempted by Title VII).
'13 Olson v. Rembrandt Printing Co., 375 F. Supp. 413, 417 (E.D. Mo. 1974) (dictum),
aff'd, 511 F.2d 1228 (8th Cir. 1975). See B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 13, at
613-14.
"I See Vera v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 448 F. Supp. 610, 613 (M.D. Pa. 1978); Enriquez
v. Honeywell, Inc., 431 F. Supp. 901, 905-06 (W.D. Okla. 1977); Mouriz v. Avondale Ship-
yards, Inc., 428 F. Supp. 1025, 1027 (E.D. La. 1977); Budinsky v. Corning Glass Works,
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other hand, charges of discrimination on the basis of alienage fall
within the scope of section 1981 215 but outside the purview of
Title VII.21 6  Furthermore, while Title VII forbids only employ-
ment discrimination, section 1981 prohibits discrimination in the
making and enforcing of all contracts. The broad language of sec-
tion 1981 also contains none of the exemptions for certain types
of employers 217 or employment practices 218 found in Title VII.
425 F. Supp. 786, 787 (W.D. Pa. 1977); Cubas v. Rapid Am. Corp., 420 F. Supp. 663, 665
(E.D. Pa. 1976).
Several trial courts have held that Hispanic plaintiffs have standing to raise a claim of
discrimination under § 1981. See, e.g., Puerto Rican Council v. Metromedia, Inc., 10 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. 1009, 1010 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (inappropriate to dismiss claim at pleading
stage based on defendant's contention that Puerto Ricans, being Caucasian, lack standing
under § 1981); Miranda v. Clothing Workers Local 208, 10 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 557, 558
(D.N.J. 1974) (argument without merit that Puerto Ricans lack § 1981 standing because
they are Caucasian); Sabala v. Western Gillette, Inc., 362 F. Supp. 1142, 1147 (S.D. Tex.
1973), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 516 F.2d 1251 (5th Cir. 1975), vacated and remanded, 431
U.S. 951 (1977) (finding that Mexican Americans had § 1981 standing vacated in light of
International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States). These cases, however, may not mean that
national origin discrimination is actionable under § 1981, because the courts might have
viewed the claims of non-white plaintiffs as actually alleging racial discrimination.
While the trend seems to be to extend § 1981 to cover discrimination based on
national origin or ethnic heritage, at least when the plaintiffs are Spanish-
surnamed, no satisfactory rationale for this extension has yet been provided.
The one obvious rationale that could be used to explain these cases is that they
have involved plaintiffs who could be considered "nonwhite," and thus within
the literal meaning of § 1981, even though they are, strictly speaking, Cauca-
sian.
B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 13, at 613. See generally Greenfield & Kates, Mexican
Americans, Racial Discrimination, and the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 63 CALIF. L. REV. 662
(1975). See also Gomez v. Pima County, 426 F. Supp. 816, 818-19 (D. Ariz. 1976) (brown-
skinned individuals, regardless of race, have § 1981 standing); League of United Latin Am.
Citizens v. City of Santa Ana, 410 F. Supp. 873, 877-78, 911-12 (C.D. Cal. 1976) (implicit
treatment of Mexican Americans' claims as involving racial discrimination under § 1981).
215 Guerra v. Manchester Terminal Corp., 498 F.2d 641, 653-54 (5th Cir. 1974).
216 Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86, 95 (1973).
217 Title VII does not apply to employers with less than fifteen employees (42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e(b) (1976)), or to uniformed members of the armed forces (Johnson v. Alexander,
572 F.2d 1219 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 986 (1978)). It also permits religious dis-
crimination by religious educational institutions. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1976). Section
1981 has been ruled inapplicable to claims of discrimination by federal government
employees. Brown v. General Servs. Adm'n, 425 U.S. 820, 829 (1976).
218 In International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977),
the Court held that § 703(h) protects the employer's use of a bona fide seniority plan that
perpetuates the discriminatory effects of pre-Title VII discriminatory policies. Section 1981
does not contain any analogous exemption from the coverage. Two circuit courts have
reasoned that such seniority plans nevertheless are subject to a similar exclusion from at-
tack under § 1981. Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 576 F.2d 1157, 1191 n.37 (5th
Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1115 (1979); Johnson v. Ryder Truck Lines, Inc., 575 F.2d
471. 475 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 979 (1979). A similar interpretation was
rejected, however, by the Third Circuit in Bolden v. Pennsylvania State Police, 578 F.2d
912, 921 (3d Cir. 1978).
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The possible relief and filing procedures under the two ac-
tions also differ. In section 1981 actions, punitive damages are
available under certain circumstances, and an award of backpay is
free from the two-year limit specified i'n Title VII.21 9  In addi-
tion, section 1981, unlike Title VII, allows a plaintiff to initiate
judicial action before exhausting the available administrative rem-
edies. 220  Finally, while Title VII contains its own set of limita-
tions periods, actions brought under section 1981, which lacks any
limitations language, fall under the control of the most analogous
state limitations period. 22 1
These differences have led at least one court and several
commentators to conclude that section 1981 claims should not be
subject to the standard of proof governing Title VII actions. 222
Some courts, however, continue to adhere to the position that de-
spite such disparities these two statutes should be accorded identi-
cal treatment on this issue.223  This mixed reaction reemphasizes
that a comparison between Title VII and section 1981 does not by
itself conclusively resolve this controversy. 224  A thorough analysis
219 Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 460 (1973).
220 Id.
221 Id. at 462.
222 See Officers for Justice v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 20 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 179, 181, 184
(N.D. Cal. 1978); Heiser, supra note 169, at 236-37; Note, Burden of Proof in Racial Discrimi-
nation Actions Brought Under the Civil Rights Acts of 1866 and 1870: Disproportionate Impact or
Discriminatmy Purpose? 1978 B.Y.U. L. REv. 1030, 1045-46; Note, supra note 179, at 22-23.
223 Davis v. County of Los Angeles, 566 F.2d 1334, 1340 (9th Cir. 1977), vacated as moot,
440 U.S. 625 (1979); Domingo v. New England Fish Co., 445 F. Supp. 421, 428 (W.D.
Wash. 1977) (citing Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971)).
For cases holding that § 1981 does not require a showing of discriminatory purpose,
with no rationale other than perhaps reasoning that Washington referred only to constitu-
tional claims, see Rule v. Bridge Workers Local 396, 568 F.2d 558, 564 (8th Cir. 1977);
Kinsey v. First Regional Sec., Inc., 557 F.2d 830, 838 n.22 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Randolph v.
United States Elevator Corp., 19 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 368, 371 (S.D. Fla. 1978); Rice v.
City of St. Louis, 19 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 197, 198 (E.D. Mo. 1978); Dawson v. Pastrick,
441 F. Supp. 133, 140-41 (N.D. Ind. 1977), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 600
F.2d 70 (7th Cir. 1979); Winston v. Smithsonian Science Information Exch., Inc., 437 F.
Supp. 456, 473 (D.D.C. 1977); Stallings v. Container Corp. of America, 75 F.R.D. 511,
516-19 (D. Del. 1977); Woods v. City of Saginaw, 13 Empl. Prac. Dec. 11,299 (E.D. Mich.
1976).
224 Although the Washington Court never addressed the § 1981 prima fade case question
directly, it hinted about its position on the issue. The Court held that the plaintiffs were
not entitled to relief on either of their statutory causes of action because the test used by
the defendants ("Test 21") was held sufficiently job-related (426 U.S. at 248-52). The
Court, arguably, should not have reached the question of the defendants' job-relatedness
defense if the plaintiffs had not established a prima facie case of discrimination through
proof of discriminatory impact. Since plaintiff's constitutional claim was dismissed for fail-
ure to allege purposeful discrimination, a prima facie statutory violation could exist only
through operation of a less stringent proof standard. Had the Court intended to apply the
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of this issue must extend beyond a comparison of section 1981
and certain constitutional and statutory provisions, and include an
evaluation of competing policy interests.
Some have argued that requiring a showing of intent in a
section 1981 prima facie case filters out frivolous and unmeritori-
ous claims. In Title VII litigation, the complex and extensive mass
of administrative procedures confronting all potential litigants
may protect the federal judiciary from an otherwise uncon-
strained torrent of cases. The absence of such an administrative
screening process in section 1981 litigation, it is concluded, neces-
sitates the use of an intent standard to perform this important
screening function.2 2 5
This suggestion rests on the premise that the exhaustion of
administrative remedies required in Title VII actions refines the
quality of cases eventually reaching the federal courts. Such a view
is unsound. Because a finding of no probable cause by the federal
agency does not bar the filing of suit,22 6 this requirement, rather
than serving as a filter, only postpones the inevitable.2 2 7
Another argument supposedly supporting an intent require-
ment in section 1981 actions is that a contrary decision will un-
dermine the holding in Washington. Since many fourteenth
amendment claims of employment discrimination could also be
brought under section 1981,228 the application of a lower stan-
dard of proof in the statutory cause of action would supposedly
encourage litigants to assert claims under section 1981 which
intent requirement to the § 1981 claim, it would not have needed to rule on the defen-
dants' defense because it had already held that the plaintiffs failed to show purposeful
discrimination. Thus, the Court either assumed or decided, sub silentio, that the constitu-
tional standard did not control the § 1981 claim. See Williams v. DeKalb County, 577 F.2d
248, 257 n.5 (5th Cir.), rev'd, 582 F.2d 2, 2-3 (5th Cir. 1978); Heiser, supra note 169, at
229.
225 See Davis v. County of Los Angeles, 566 F.2d 1334, 1350 (9th Cir. 1977) (dissenting
opinion, Wallace, J.), vacated as moot, 440 U.S. 625 (1979).
226 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 798-99 (1973).
In fact, the statute and its accompanying guidelines permit the filing of suit after 180
days from the date a charge was filed with the EEOC, regardless of whether the agency
has taken any action with respect to it during that period. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1)
(1976); 29 C.F.R. § 1601.28(a) (1978). See generally B. SCHLEi & P. GROSSMAN, supra note
13, at 913-19.
227 See Heiser, supra note 169, at 243-44.
228 Although § 1981 does not apply to claims of discrimination filed by federal govern-
ment employees (Brown v. General Servs. Adm'n, 425 U.S. 820, 833-34 (1976)), it provides
a basis for relief for state and local government workers. See B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN,
supra note 13, at 608 & n.l1.
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could not satisfy the constitutional standard, thus circumventing
the ruling in Washington and burdening the courts with claims of
nonintentional discrimination.229 Although this prediction is un-
doubtedly accurate in fact, it is not extremely compelling. The
Washington Court itself recognized that Title VII actions, many of
which could be brought under the fourteenth amendment, are
not controlled by the standard of proof governing constitutional
claims. 230  Thus, since the Supreme Court was not concerned
about possible circumvention of its ruling in Washington through
the use of Title VII, it is likely that the Court was similarly un-
concerned about the use of section 1981 to bypass the constitu-
tional intent requirement of Washington.
Others often seize on the broad scope of section 1981, ex-
tending to most contractual as well as certain noncontractual ar-
rangements, 23 1 as another reason for limiting its availability to
cases of intentional discrimination. 232  This sentiment parallels
the concern expressed by the Washington Court about the effect of
extending impact analysis to allegations of constitutional viola-
tions. 2 3 3  At least one commentator has noted, however, that
these fears expressed by the Court in Washington were unfounded
in light of evidence that the lower courts' application of the Griggs
standard to constitutional claims prior to Washington did not result
in a wholesale invalidation of statutes. 234
Moreover, even if the Court's apprehensions are well-
grounded, they are outweighed by the policy considerations pro-
moted by applying impact analysis to section 1981 litigation. As
the Ninth Circuit forcefully stated in Davis v. County of Los
Angeles,235 an extension of the rule in Washington to section 1981
cases would significantly dilute the effectiveness of this statute.236
By requiring minority persons to show that an employer's action
resulted from a discriminatory motive, the Court already has
229 See Davis v. County of Los Angeles, 566 F.2d 1334, 1350 (9th Cir. 1977) (dissenting
opinion, Wallace, J.), vacated as moot, 440 U.S. 625 (1979).
230 426 U.S. at 239.
231 See note 168 supra.
232 See Davis v. County of Los Angeles, 566 F.2d 1334, 1347 (9th Cir. 1977) (dissenting
opinion, Wallace, J.), vacated as moot, 440 U.S. 625 (1979); Heiser, supra note 169, at 245-
46.
232 426 U.S. at 247-48 & n.14.
234 Note, supra note 179, at 26.
25 566 F.2d 1334 (9th Cir. 1977), vacated as moot, 440 U.S. 625 (1979).
236 Id. at 1340.
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erected a frequently insurmountable obstacle to successful pros-
ecution of actions under the Constitution. Further expansion of
the intent requirement to section 1981 actions would diminish the
civil rights litigant's arsenal because litigants have no constitutional
rights of action to attack the discriminatory practices of private
employers. Section 1981's broad mandate to eliminate the evil of
racial discrimination in the making and enforcing of contracts can
be fulfilled only by the liberal construction given Title VII by the
Griggs Court. Disproportionate impact must remain a possible
basis for stating a claim under section 1981 if the courts are to
fulfill the remedial objectives of this statute. The more sophisti-
cated and covert, but no less real, discriminatory effects generated
by facially neutral policies should not receive the immunity from
attack that necessarily results from adoption of an intent require-
ment. Thus, as with Title VII plaintiffs, persons asserting section
1981 claims should be able to establish a prima facie case of dis-
crimination by showing the discriminatory consequences of an
employer's facially unbiased conduct.
3. Application and Impact of the Intent Requirement
Many courts, however, have rejected these arguments and
have ruled that plaintiffs must show discriminatory purpose to es-
tablish a prima facie case under section 1981.237 This judicial
gloss on the statute has virtually destroyed the Act's effectiveness.
An examination of these opinions graphically reveals this eviscera-
tion of section 1981 as a legislative bulwark against discriminatory
employment policies.
Although the Washington Court announced that intent is a
requisite element in a prima facie claim of unconstitutional dis-
crimination, it failed to offer much specific guidance about the
nature of the proof required to establish discriminatory motive. It
stated only that disproportionate impact is a factor to consider,
237 See Williams v. DeKalb County, 582 F.2d 2, 2-3 (5th Cir.), reversing, 577 F.2d 248
(5th Cir. 1978); Donnell v. General Motors Corp., 576 F.2d 1292, 1300 (8th Cir. 1978);
Chicano Police Officer's Ass'n v. Stover, 552 F.2d 918, 920-21 (10th Cir. 1977); City of
Milwaukee v. Saxbe, 546 F.2d 693, 705 (7th Cir. 1976); United States v. City of Montgom-
ery, 19 Empl. Prac. Dec. 9239 (N.D. Ala. 1979); Johnson v. Baylor College of Medicine,
19 Empl. Prac. Dec. 9047 (S.D. Tex. 1979); United States v. City of Buffalo, 457 F. Supp.
612, 618 (W.D.N.Y. 1978); Arnold v. Ballard, 448 F. Supp. 1025, 1027-28 (N.D. Ohio
1978); Milburn v. Girard, 441 F. Supp. 184, 188 (E.D. Pa. 1977); Johnson v. Hoffman, 424
F. Supp. 490, 493-94 (E.D. Mo. 1977), aff'd sub nom. Johnson v. Alexander, 572 F.2d 1219
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 986 (1978).
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but is insufficient in itself to support a finding of discriminatory
purpose, 238 except in extreme situations. 239
During the succeeding term, however, the Court, in Village of
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 4 ° de-
scribed in greater detail some acceptable methods of proving in-
tent. Recognizing that official decisions are influenced by multiple
factors, the Court declared that Washington did not require the
plaintiff to prove that discrimination was the government's exclu-
sive,.dominant, or even primary motivation. Rather, the aggrieved
party need only show that discriminatory purpose was "a motivat-
ing factor" in the decision. 241  In determining whether discrimi-
nation was a motivating factor, courts should consider the totality
of the circumstances. The Court mentioned several criteria that
are relevant to this inquiry: the decision's historical background,
the sequence of events immediately preceding the decision, the
extent to which the subject act constituted a departure from stan-
dard operating procedure, the legislative or administrative history
behind the decision, and the decision's discriminatory impact.2 42
Only in the rare case of egregiously disproportionate exclusion,
for which discriminatory purpose becomes the only convincing
explanation, will the plaintiff satisfy his burden solely by showing
impact.2 43
Predictably, of all the reported cases in which a court im-
posed the Arlington formula for proving intent in either a Title
VII or section 1981 action, only one plaintiff successfully satisfied
this stringent standard. 244  In every other case, plaintiffs were
denied relief because of their inability to unearth the elusive sort
of evidence required to prove such a subjective concept. 245
This rule has saddled civil rights litigants with a serious hand-
icap. In response, some courts have interpreted the intent re-
quirement for both Title VII and section 1981 in a manner more
238 426 U.S. at 242.
239 Id.
240 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
241 Id. at 265-66.
242 Id. at 266-68.
243 Id. at 266. See Pennsylvania v. Local 542, International Union of Operating Eng'rs,
469 F. Supp. 329, 398 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (dictum).
244 Pennsylvania v. Local 542, International Union of Operating Eng'rs, 469 F. Supp.
329, 392 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
245 For further discussion of the problems associated with proving intent, see Note, The
Role of Circumstantial Evidence in Proving Discriminatory Intent: Developments Since Washington
v. Davis, 19 B.C. L. REv. 795, 798-800 (1978).
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amenable to proof by objective factors. This approach relies on
the venerable tort concept that an individual intends the foresee-
able consequences of his voluntary conduct.24 6  Under this formu-
lation, the court will presume a discriminatory purpose if it finds
that an employer continued to use a facially neutral policy after
discovering its discriminatory impact.2 47  By equating intent with
the retention of policies known to result in discriminatory con-
sequences, these courts have ameliorated the harshest aspects of
the Washington-Arlington rule. Permitting plaintiffs to establish a
prima facie case through the use of such objective evidence pro-
motes the remedial policies of these statutes because it removes
some unnecessarily burdensome proof problems inherent in estab-
lishing the subjective concept of motivation.248
The future of this formula, however, received a potentially
fatal blow from a recent Supreme Court decision. In Personnel
Administrator v. Feeney,249 a Massachusetts statute giving veterans
an absolute preference in all state civil service appointments was
challenged on the ground that it discriminated against women in
contravention of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment. After reemphasizing that proof of disproportionate
exclusionary impact, without additional evidence of discriminatory
purpose, fails to make good a claim under the Constitution, 5 ° the
Court rejected the plaintiff's efforts at satisfying the intent stan-
dard through evidence of disproportionate impact.
246 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A (1965).
247 See Dickerson v. United States Steel Corp., 439 F. Supp. 55, 77, 80 (E.D. Pa. 1977),
rev'd in part, 582 F.2d 827 (3d Cir. 1978); Delgado v. McTighe, 442 F. Supp. 725, 727-28
(E.D. Pa. 1977). Contra, United States v. City of Chicago, 549 F.2d 415, 435 (7th Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 875 (1977); Vanguard Justice Soc'y v. Hughes, 471 F. Supp. 670,
698-701 (D. Md. 1979).
248 This analysis has been attacked as circumvention of the intent requirement of
Washington. Critics of this theory suggest that a requirement of foreseeability adds nothing
to the impact standard because disproportionate exclusionary effects are, by definition,
foreseeable. Thus, these commentators conclude, any real distinction between intent and
impact is substantially, if not completely eliminated. See Perry, supra note 90, at 579-80;
Comment, supra note 90, at 733-34.
If the courts presumed foreseeability simply from the fact of disparate impact, this
challenge would be persuasive. But these analysts fail to mention that under the proposed
definition of intent, the plaintiff must prove that the subject employment criteria was re-
tained after the employer knew or should have known of its discriminatory impact. At that
point, the burden should shift to the defendant to rebut the appropriate inference that
continued use of such a test or other employment practice is motivated by a desire to
perpetuate the discriminatory results.
249 99 S. Ct. 2282 (1979).
250 Id. at 2293.
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The plaintiffs urged that because the legislature could foresee
that a veterans' preference would disproportionately exclude
women applicants, the discriminatory results generated by the
enactment were intentional.25' After admitting that the state
legislature must have recognized the future impact of its decision,
the Court nevertheless concluded that the constitutional standard
of discriminatory purpose implied more than cognizance of the
challenged action's consequences.252 The realization that a statute
will create adverse consequences, the Court stated, simply did not
mean that the legislators enacted it for that purpose. 253  Although
it acknowledged the well-recognized principle that persons are
presumed to intend the foreseeable consequences of their
action, 25 4 the Court once again engaged in some Gilbert-style
sleight-of-hand 255 rather than logically explaining its rejection of
the discrimination claim. Producing a foreseeable discriminatory
impact, the Court reasoned, evidenced intention only in the sense
of volition, and not purpose. Such a showing indicated simply that
the legislature acted voluntarily; it did not mean that the legisla-
ture intended to create the foreseeable results of its conduct.256
The Court misstated the relationship between voluntariness
and intent. 25 7 Absent direct evidence of motive, a showing of
knowledge of a foreseeable result normally creates a presumption
that the actor intended the consequences of his act.258  Whether
he acted voluntarily is a separate question, demanding inquiry
into the presence of factors such as fraud, incompetence, and
undue influence. The Court's disingenuous linkage of intent and
volition represents another attempt to judicially impair the protec-
tion of constitutionally based civil rights.
Plaintiffs in future employment discrimination litigation may
avoid the prejudicial impact of this decision, however, by distin-
251 Id. at 2295.
252 Id. at 2296.
253 Id.
254 Id. at 2295-96, 2296 n.25.
255 See notes 155-66 and accompanying text supra.
256 99 S. Ct. at 2296.
2'57 See, e.g., C. GREGORY, H. KALVEN, JR. & R. EPSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS
3-8 (3d ed. 1977); J. HENDERSON & R. PEARSON, THE TORTS PROCESS 13-15 (1975); W.
PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 8 (4th ed. 1971); W. PROSSER, J. WADE & V.
SCHWARTZ, TORTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 16-28 (6th ed. 1976).
258 See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 8 (4th ed. 1971); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A (1965). The Ninth Circuit recently held that the tort doctrine of
respondeat superior applies to Title VII actions. Miller v. Bank of America, 600 F.2d 211,
213 (9th Cir. 1979).
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guishing Feeney on the ground that the defendant offered several
non-discriminatory justifications for the statute.2 59  The Court's
restrictive interpretation of intent may not necessarily control
those cases where the defendant makes no showing. In such in-
stances, plaintiffs should be able to establish intent under the
foreseeability framework. If, on the other hand, Feeney is read ex-
pansively and applied to statutory as well as constitutional claims,
then the Court will have erected another impediment to an indi-
vidual's ability to protect his right to equal employment opportu-
nity.
E. Summary
In Washington v. Davis, the Court imposed an onerous burden
on civil rights litigants by requiring a showing of purposeful dis-
crimination in any claim asserted under the Constitution. 26 0  Al-
though the Court has not discussed whether this ruling applies to
claims for relief brought under federal antidiscrimination statutes,
many lower federal courts have sensed the Court's increasing hos-
tility towards such claims and have extended the Washington rule
to actions filed under Title VII and section 1981.261 Careful
examination of the legislative history, constitutional genesis, and
the policies underlying the enactment of these statutes, however,
reveals that they should not fall under the constitutional ruling in
Washington and that they should be amenable to the dispropor-
tionate impact standard originally articulated'by the Court in
Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 262  If the courts choose to impose an
intent requirement upon statutory claims, they should ameliorate
the harshness of that rule by applying the traditional tort defini-
tion of intent.26 3  Finally, although the Supreme Court has re-
cently suggested that it does not approve of the foreseeability def-
inition of intent, that case may be limited to its facts.
259 99 S. Ct. at 2288-89, 2296.
26 See notes 86-91 and accompanying text supra.
261 See notes 134-35 and accompanying text supra.
262 See notes 136-48 and accompanying text supra.





A. New York City Transit Authority v. Beazer
The antagonism towards civil rights claims and the guileful
reasoning that pervaded the Court's opinions in Washington,
Furnco, Sweeney, and Feeney has been perpetuated in two of its
most recent employment discrimination decisions. New York City
Transit Authority v. Beazer 264 involved a challenge to an absolute
exclusion from any employment of former heroin addicts who
were participating in methadone maintenance programs or who
had successfully concluded such participation. Under this policy,
no consideration was given to the merits of an individual
employee or applicant. The plaintiffs' complaint alleged that this
policy violated the fourteenth amendment due process and equal
protection clauses, section 1981, and Title VII.
In connection with their claim under Title VII, the plaintiffs
asserted that the policy disproportionately excluded blacks and
Hispanics. This, they claimed, violated the prohibitions against ra-
cial discrimination. 0 5 The trial court held that because this blan-
ket ban applied to all positions, regardless of their sensitivity or
the abilities of the individual applicant, the rule was impermissibly
overbroad and thus violated the equal protection and due process
guarantees of the fourteenth amendment. Having thus ruled in
the plaintiffs' favor on their constitutional claim, the court did not
discuss the substantive statutory rights of action. 66
Subsequently, plaintiffs renewed their claim before the dis-
trict court for relief under Title VII.2 67 In a supplemental opin-
ion, the trial court found the defendants' policy generated a dis-
proportionate exclusionary impact upon blacks and Hispanics,
264 440 U.S. 568 (1979), rev'g, 558 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1977), aff'g, 399 F. Supp. 1032
(S.D.N.Y. 1975).
265 399 F. Supp. at 1033.
266 Id. at 1058-59.
267 Beazer v. New York City Transit Auth., 414 F. Supp 277 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd, 558
F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1977), rev'd, 440 U.S. 568 (1979). Plaintiffs admitted that the sole purpose
of this effort was to obtain an award of attorney's fees. 414 F. Supp. at 278. The trial court
rendered its initial judgment before Congress enacted the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees
Award Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976). Thus, because § 1981 did not expressly
provide for an award of attorney's fees, such an award in connection with that cause of
action was prohibited. See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240
(1975). Tide VII, of course, expressly permits the granting of attorney's fees to the prevail-
ing party. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1976).
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and served no business necessity. 268 These findings led to a con-
clusion that the defendants had violated Title VII's ban on racial
discrimination .269
On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed the ruling on the
plaintiffs' constitutional claim 270 but did not pass on the plaintiffs'
statutory claims.271  The Supreme Court, however, did address
the Title VII issue. The Court acknowledged that the discrimina-
tory impact standard continued to serve as a basis for establishing
a violation of Title VII. But it reversed the trial judge's findings
of fact and held that the plaintiffs were not entitled to relief
under Title VII.272
Judge Griesa had based his finding of disproportionate
exclusionary impact on two statistics. First, 81% of all employees
defendant referred to its medical consultant for suspected viola-
tion of its drug policy were black or Hispanic. Second, between 62
and 65% of all persons participating in New York City methadone
maintenance programs were black or Hispanic.273
The Supreme Court rejected this reasoning, stating that these
statistics did not establish that the employer's policy violated Title
VII. The first figure, the Court reasoned, was too general because
it related only to the number of employees suspected of violating
the company's rule, not the number actually dismissed. 274  A simi-
268 414 F. Supp. at 278-79.
289 Id. at 279. Although District Judge Griesa applied the impact standard to plaintiffs'
Title VII claim against a city agency, this opinion was rendered before the Supreme Court
issued its decision in Washington v. Davis.
270 558 F.2d at 99.
271 After Judge Griesa issued his supplemental opinion, but before his judgment became
final, Congress passed the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1988 (1976). Shortly after the passage of that statute, Judge Griesa granted the plaintiffs'
motion for a declaration that this enactment provided a basis for awarding attorney's fees
for the constitutional claim the plaintiffs filed under § 1983. 414 F. Supp. at 279. The
Second Circuit upheld that ruling which gave effect to a new statute in a pending case. 558
F.2d at 100.
Because the Title VII action was filed only for the purpose of securing a predicate for
an award of attorney's fees, this intervening legislation obviated the necessity for the appel-
late court to rule on that statutory claim. Id.
272 440 U.S. at 583-84.
272 414 F. Supp. at 278-79.
274 440 U.S. at 585. The district court's ruling in favor of the plaintiffs' Title VII claims
extended to the application of the narcotics rule to both past and present participants in
methadone maintenance programs. 414 F. Supp. at 279. The appellate court did not ad-
dress the statutory question. 558 F.2d at 99-100. The Supreme Court, noting the trial
judge's statement that the defendant's policy towards successful past participation in
methadone programs was unclear, stated that, because it could find no evidence that de-
fendant refused employment to any former methadone user, the issue of the validity of the
rule in relation to former users was not properly before it. 440 U.S. at 572 n.3.
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lar criticism was leveled against the second statistic. Figures outlin-
ing the racial mix of the surrounding community, the Court de-
clared, do not prove the impact of the defendant's narcotics rule
because they do not relate directly to the racial composition of the
relevant class-those transit authority job applicants and
employees receiving methadone treatment. The Court charac-
terized such general population statistics as overinclusive and thus
an insufficiently probative basis upon which to predicate a prima
facie case of discriminatory impact.2 75  The Court concluded by
stating rather harshly that this type of statistic "reveals little," "tells
us nothing," and is "virtually irrelevant." 2 76
The rigorous standard for statistical proof of discriminatory
impact reflected in the Beazer opinion suggests that the Court is
ignoring its prior decisions and reformulating its position on this
critical issue. If Beazer foreshadows the rejection of the use of
general population data and the limitation of the presentation of
statistics restricted to those of actual applicants and employees, it
represents the imposition of another onerous burden upon the
prosecution of Griggs-type claims.
In Griggs, the plaintiffs established their prima facie case with
general population statistics. By comparing the percentage of
blacks and whites in this group who did not satisfy the employer's
high school diploma requirement, they successfully proved the po-
tential discriminatory impact of that facially neutral policy. 27 7
This type of statistical proof also was utilized successfully by
the plaintiffs in Dothard v. Rawlinson.278 Those Title VII plaintiffs
attacked the statutorily-imposed height and weight requirements
for the position of correctional counselor with the Alabama Board
of Corrections. They offered statistical evidence of the general
relative capacity of men and women to satisfy this standard. 279
The defendants challenged this showing on the ground that plain-
tiffs had not introduced comparative statistics concerning actual
job applicants. 28 0 Citing Griggs, the Court rejected the defen-
275 440 U.S. at 585-86. The Court added that even if this "weak" statistical showing was
enough to establish a prima facie case, it was rebutted by the defendant's demonstration
that the narcotics rule's application to present users of methadone was job-related. Id. at
586.
276 Id. at 587.
277 401 U.S. at 430 n.6.
278 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
279 Id. at 329-30.
280 Id. at 330.
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dants' assertion, stating that "[t]here is no requirement... that a
statistical showing of disproportionate impact must always be
based on analysis of the characteristics of actual applicants." 28 '
The Beazer Court made no effort to distinguish either Griggs
or Dothard or to justify this significant shift in its approach to dis-
proportionate impact analysis. 282  The entire discussion of this
issue is contained in one footnote where the Court suggested that
the language it employed in Dothard was undermined sub-
sequently in International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United
States.2 83  As Justice White recognized in his dissenting opinion,
however, evidence in Teamsters justified the inference that general
population figures might not accurately measure the pool of qual-
ified job applicants.284 The Beazer majority, on the other hand,
made that presumption in the absence of any such supporting
evidence.285 Moreover, as Justice White noted, the majority of-
fered no reason for refusing to infer from the facts that individu-
als were rejected pursuant to the narcotics rule and that blacks are
more likely to violate the rule, that therefore the application of
such a policy will exclude blacks more frequently than whites.286
The Court also reversed the judgment rendered by the trial
court rather than remand the case for reconsideration in light of
the newly adopted proof standard. This action is particularly sur-
prising because the defendants never raised this specific issue be-
fore either the trial or appellate courts. The Court concluded that
the plaintiffs failed to prove their statutory claim in the absence of
a ruling by the appellate court on that claim.287
Although this heavy burden of proof for these plaintiffs may
have resulted from the Court's concern over the special problems
associated with drug abuse, the Court certainly made no effort in
Beazer to so limit its ruling. Rather, the Court's unqualified and
forceful language suggests a broad scope of interpretation. If so,
it could join Washington in seriously impairing the effectiveness of
281 Id.
282 For a thorough discussion of the various statistical methods of proving dispropor-
tionate impact and a catalogue of the many lower court decisions recognizing the validity
of general population statistics, see B. SCHLE1 & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 13, at 1158-81; id.
at 318-26 (Supp. 1979).
283 440 U.S. at 586 n.29 (citing International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431
U.S. 324. 340 n.20 (1977)).
284 Id. at 573 n.5.
285 Id.
286 Id.
287 Id. at 599 (dissenting opinion, White, J.).
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civil rights litigation. It surely will severely constrict the continued
force of Griggs impact analysis and ultimately might effect a sub
silentio erosion of that standard.
B. County of Los Angeles v. Davis
In County of Los Angeles v. Davis, 28 8 the Supreme Court had an
opportunity to provide much needed guidance on the nature of
proof necessary to establish a prima facie case under section 1981.
The Court, however, avoided ruling on the role of intent in ac-
tions brought under that statute by declaring the case moot.289 In
so ruling, the Court either ignored or impliedly reversed findings
of fact made by the courts below, and also improperly applied the
rules governing mootness.
In 1971, the Los Angeles Fire Department designed a new
pre-employment written examination for entry-level positions to
replace, in 1972, its admittedly discriminatory 1969 exam.290 The
examination was given but no appointments were made for some
time because of a state action challenging the county's plan to in-
terview randomly a portion of those who passed the exam. 291 To
fill the increasing number of vacant positions, the county pro-
posed to interview the top 544 scorers on that exam, even though
whites predominantly received the highest scores. Because minor-
ity representatives objected to this proposal, the county aban-
doned its plan and agreed to interview all who passed the 1972
test.292 The plaintiffs, representing a class of present and future
black and Mexican-American job applicants, claimed that the
county's use of the 1969 test as a hiring criterion and the 1972
test as a screening device to select candidates for interviews consti-
tuted unlawful discrimination under Title VII and section
1981.293 The trial court ruled in the plaintiffs' favor on both
statutory claims and issued a comprehensive, racially-based, accel-
erated hiring order.294
288 440 U.S. 625 (1979), vacating as moot, 566 F.2d 1334 (9th Cir. 1978), aff'g in part, rev'g
in part, 8 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 239 (C.D. Cal. 1973).
289 440 U.S. at 633.
290 Id. at 628.
291 Id.
292 566 F.2d at 1345-46 (dissenting opinion, Wallace, J.).
293 440 U.S. at 627. Before the 1972 test, a 1969 test was used to rank job candidates.
This procedure was discontinued after 1969. Id. at 627-28.
A minimum height and weight requirement was also attacked by plaintiffs, but this
issue was not discussed by the Supreme Court. Id. at 630 n.2.
294 8 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 241-43.
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On appeal, the Ninth Circuit upheld that portion of the trial
judge's opinion dealing with the invalidity of the 1972 test.2 95
The appellate court then stated that the county's decision not to
limit interviews to the top achievers on the 1972 test did not ren-
der the case moot, because the continuing threat that the exami-
nation might be used was unlawful by itself.2
96
The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the court of
appeals and ordered it to direct the district court to dismiss the
action on the ground that it had become moot during the litiga-
tion.297 The Court reasoned that because the county did not use
the results of the 1972 examination in any contested fashion, a
live controversy between the parties no longer existed. In making
this determination, however, the Court articulated 298 but then
misapplied the two conditions for mootness set forth in United
States v. W.T. Grant Co. 2 99
Although voluntary cessation of purportedly unlawful con-
duct does not render a controversy moot, a court loses jurisdiction
if the defendant proves the absence of any reasonable expectation
that the challenged action will be repeated. 30 0 This condition, the
Court stated, was satisfied because the emergency conditions that
compelled the county to consider using the 1972 examination as a
ranking device-a temporary emergency shortage of fire fighters
and the absence of an alternative method of screening job
applicants-were unique and unlikely to recur.301 As Justice Pow-
ell recognized in his dissenting opinion, however, this assumption
flies in the face of the findings of the lower courts and the evi-
dence in the record.30 2
In support of its conclusion, the Court noted that the county
had now adopted a nondiscriminatory method of screening job
applicants. This new procedure, however, directly resulted from
the trial court's imposition of the hiring order and injunction
upon defendant. 30 3 While the Court found no reason to believe
that the defendant would terminate its use of this new screening
295 566 F.2d at 1341.
296 Id. at 1341 & n.14.
297 440 U.S. at 627, 633.
296 Id. at 631.
299 345 U.S. 629 (1953).
300 Id. at 632-33.
301 440 U.S. at 632.
302 Id. at 641.
303 See 8 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 242-43.
1979]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
method if the trial court's injunction and order was dissolved, it
offered no evidentiary support for this inference.30 4 In addition,
the Court ignored the court of appeals' finding that the instant
lawsuit prompted the county's decision to refrain from using the
1972 examination to rank applicants. 30 5  In light of the presump-
tion against mootness and the defendant's heavy burden to dem-
onstrate the absence of a controversy, the Court's willingness to
make this inference was unjustified.
A case also may become moot if intervening events irrevoca-
bly eradicate any effects generated by defendant's purported un-
lawful conduct. 30 6  This criterion was satisfied, the Court an-
nounced, because the county's compliance with the trial court's
injunction and hiring order during the five years since its
promulgation had resulted in a substantial increase in minority
hiring.307  Once again, however, the Court too readily discounted
the possibility that following dissolution of the trial court order,
the defendant would revert to a discriminatory method of select-
ing future employees.
Thus, by engaging in unjustified speculation and either dis-
regarding or refuting findings of fact made by the trial and appel-
late courts, the Supreme Court eschewed ruling on the merits and
perpetuated the uncertainty surrounding the proper role of intent
in establishing a section 1981 prima facie case.
CONCLUSION
Commentators frequently have portrayed the Burger Court
as less than sympathetic to the plight and claims of civil rights
litigants. They have described its decisions in the area of consti-
tutional criminal procedure, the first amendment and the right to
privacy as narrow and restrictive in substance, and imprecise and
manipulative in analysis. This attitude also pervades the Court's
04 Moreover, in his dissenting opinion, Justice Powell reveals that in its reply brief, the
county admitted that its hiring procedures were undertaken under the compulsion of the
trial court order. 440 U.S. at 642.
305 566 F.2d at 1341. Justice Powell's opinion also indicates that the trial judge made an
identical finding of fact. 440 U.S. at 639.
306 440 U.S. at 631.
"I Id. at 633.
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rulings on the requirements of a prima facie case in employment
discrimination litigation.
In Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters and Board of Trustees v.
Sweeney, the Court attempted to clarify the nature of plaintiff's
original burden of production in actions based on a claim of dis-
parate treatment. Unfortunately, by using imprecise and ambigu-
ous language as well as frequent question-begging, the Court did
little to refine its thinking and merely contributed further to the
confusion surrounding this question.
The continued efficacy of constitutionally-based claims of dis-
crimination was severly limited by the imposition of an intent re-
quirement in Washington v. Davis. The Court predicated this
landmark ruling on a misguided interpretation of its own prece-
dent and wholesale summary rejection of an extensive body of
appellate case law.
The Court's ruling in Personnel Administrator v. Feeney further
enhanced Washington's prejudicial effect on actions to preserve
plaintiffs' constitutional rights. The Feeney Court held that show-
ing the defendant could foresee the discriminatory impact of its
facially neutral policy did not establish intent.
The Washington decision also raised the question of whether
intent was a necessary element of plaintiff's prima facie case in
actions brought under the federal antidiscrimination statutes. Al-
though the Court has yet to rule directly on this question, in Gen-
eral Electric Co. v. Gilbert it did equate, in another context, the con-
stitutional and statutory definitions of discrimination by engaging in
an unparalleled exercise of semantic legerdemain. Many of the
lower courts have interpreted Washington and Gilbert
broadly and extended the intent requirement to statutory claims.
Although the Court has never explicitly supported that expansion
of Washington, it undermined the Griggs impact theory in New York
City Transit Authority v. Beazer. In Beazer, the Court rejected the
plaintiffs' attempt to establish a prima facie case of disproportionate
impact with general population statistics. Instead, it announced that
plaintiffs must provide statistical evidence of the policy's impact on
actual applicants. This substantial departure from precedent pro-
ceeded without any discussion of the Supreme Court's prior deci-
sions.
Finally, in Country of Los Angeles v. Davis, the Court eschewed
an opportunity to rule definitively on the role of intent in section
1981 actions. In dismissing the action because of mootness, the
Court relied upon inferences and speculation unsupported by the
1979]
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record and contrary to findings of fact made by the lower courts.
Although some of these decisions may be distinguished and
their impact avoided in the short term, the essence of the opin-
ions reflects an underlying antipathy towards civil rights claims.
The unprincipled and contrived reasoning running through these
opinions manifests an intentional effort by the Court to impede
litigants' ability to secure their rights to equal employment oppor-
tunity by raising the requirements of the prima facie case. The
merits of this policy decision notwithstanding, the Court's opin-
ions too frequently demonstrate a level of legal reasoning falling
far short of the standard expected from our nation's highest tri-
bunal.
